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shareholders, including their types and control rights, on the cash dividend payout
announcement,usingasampleof1,200Chinese listed firms.Theresultsof thisanalysis
provide sound support for the viewpoint that the cash dividend policy is related to
ownershipstructureintheChinesemarket.Specifically,theleveloftheultimatecontrolling
shareholders’controlrights,definedastheaggregatedirectandindirectshareholdings,is
positively correlated with the likelihood andmagnitude of the cash dividend payout.
Further, the outcomes also demonstrate that firms with various types of ultimate
controlling shareholders exhibit divergence in the likelihood and magnitude of cash
dividendpayouts.Thecashpayoutpolicyisalsosensitivetofirmcharacteristicssuchassize,
profitabilityandfinancialleverage.
This thesis also investigates the investors’ reactions towards the dividend
announcementswithasample from1,203Chinese listed firms.Theresults indicatethat









This thesis alsoextends the investigation intohow cashdividend announcements
influence the subsequentearningsgrowth in theChinesemarket.Consistentwith some
contemporary studies, the results suggest that a higher cashpayout is associatedwith
betterfutureearningsgrowth,butthepositiveassociationdiminishesasthepayoutratio
increases.Thestockdividenddecisionisnegativelycorrelatedwithfutureearningsgrowth,


















































































































































































In the United States and the United Kingdom, the conflict of interest between
shareholdersandentrepreneurs,knownastheagencycost,1hasraisedconcernsbecause
dispersedshareholderscannotmonitorthedailyoperationsofthefirm,whilethemanagers
havethediscretiontousethe firm’sresourcestopursuepersonal interests (Jensenand
Meckling,1976).Specifically,themanagersarelikelytoabusethefirm’sfreecashflowand
conductempireͲbuildingactivities,suchastakeͲoverspreesandinvestinginprojectswith
nonͲpositive net present value (Jensen, 1986). Consequently, a corporate governance
mechanismisnecessarytomonitorandrestrictmanagers’selfͲdealingactivities(Barneaet
al.,1981,FamaandJensen,1983,AgrawalandKnoeber,1996,Gillan,2006,Shleiferand
Vishny, 1997), amongwhich cash dividends become an importantmeasure of internal
corporate governancemechanisms to copewith the agency costof free cash flow.2By
























have both motivation and capability to manipulate the dividend policy and benefit
themselvesmorethanminorityshareholders(ShleiferandVishny,1997).
Thedividendpolicy,includingbothcashdividendsandstockdividends,intheChinese
equitymarkethasbecomean interesting topic.Althoughpastempirical studies suggest
Chineselistedfirmspaylesscashdividendstoshareholdersthanfirmsinothercountries
(LaPortaetal.,2000a,Allenetal.,2005),thisphenomenonhaschangedinrecentyears.






relationship between investors and managers, as well as between large and small
shareholders. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on dividend payout policy and its
interactionwithownershipstructure,abnormalstockreturnandfutureearningsgrowth,as
China’s equitymarketwas established to support its transformation towards amarket
orientedeconomyaftersignificanteconomicreformswereenacted.
MoststudiesondividendpolicyintheChinesemarket4areassociatedwithitsunique
features, especially the highly concentrated ownership and the nonͲnegotiable shares
underthesplitsharestructure.5ForthenonͲnegotiableshareholders,cashdividendsare
theonlyjustifiedmeanstorealizetheirinvestmentreturns.6Someempiricalstudies,such
asGul (1999),Cheng et al. (2009) andHuang et al. (2011), take the stateͲownednonͲ
negotiable shares as the proxy of the influence of large shareholders, and report nonͲ
negotiableshareholders’preferenceforcashdividends.Unliketheaforementionedstudies,
the first research question of this thesis will focus on the relationship between cash

3BecausetheChineseequitymarketwasdesignedtosupporttheentrenchedstateͲownedenterprises,most
Chinese listed firmsadoptedaresidualdividendpolicy,that is, investmentopportunityoverridesthecash
dividendpayout.Inotherwords,cashdividendpolicytooksecondplace.
4DissimilartoUnitedStatesandotherdevelopedmarkets,theChinesestockmarketdoesnottreatshare














direct shareholdings, control rights are better measurements of ultimate controlling
shareholders’influenceonthelistedfirm.Moreover,afterthesplitsharestructurereform
(SSSR)was completed and all common shares became negotiable, the negotiability of
commonshareswasnolongeraspecialfeatureoftheChineseequitymarket.
Besides the level of control rights, this thesis also lays emphasis on the types of




of stateͲowned investors still maintain the status of government agencies with
responsibilitiesbeyondeconomicprofits.Intuitively,listedfirmswiththistypeofultimate
controllingshareholderareexposed to loweragencycostsas themanagersarebonded
politically. However, the minority shareholders in these firms are subject to more
expropriation risk,because themanagersaremore likely tocollaboratewithcontrolling













are alsomore likely to own shares in the listed firmswith better quality and stronger










cash dividends. In developedmarkets, the unexpected cash dividend announcement is

















these UCSs and incorporate these factors into firm valuation. Further, an unexpected
changeincashdividendannouncementfrom listedfirmswithdifferenttypesofultimate
controlling shareholdersmayalso conveydifferent informationdue to the fundamental





third research question of this thesis is to investigate how the cash dividend payout
influencesfutureearningsgrowth.Asperthetraditional ‘peckingorder’theory,ahigher

























Chapter 2 supplies a review of the existing literature in order to establish three
themesofresearchthathavedominatedthedividendpolicyliterature.Thefirstpartofthis
chapteroutlinesthefirstfocusofresearchpertainingtotherelationshipbetweencorporate
control rights and dividend policy. The second part includes the literature on the
relationshipbetweendividendpayout,corporatecontrolrightsandstockabnormalreturn,
while the last part presents the relationship between dividend payout policy and
subsequentequityfinancing.Basedonthetraditionaldividendtheoryandagencytheory,
the relationship between dividend policy and controlling shareholders is relatively
8
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convert from the subsidiariesofmultiple levelgovernments to independententitiesvia



















ownership. In addition, four dummy variables, which indicate the types of UCSs, are
included along with the level of control rights. The analysis suggests that both the
propensityandthemagnitudeofcashdividendpayoutarepositivelyassociatedwiththe
control rights, consistentwith the findings in Cheng et al. (2009) that nonͲnegotiable
shareholdersprefercashdividends.SimilartoChenetal.(2009c),differenttypesofUCSs













ownedultimate controlling shareholders.Thisempirical chapter contributes topropose
controlrights,ratherthannonͲnegotiableshareholdings,tobeusedasthemeasurement







whether thispatternhascontinued since theSecuritiesLawwasenforced in1999.The
announcement effect ismeasured by the cumulative abnormal return across different
eventwindows.Thestockdividendisproxiedbyadummyvariable,whilethecashdividend
shockismeasuredastheunexpectedcashdividendadjustedbyindustryaveragegrowth.It




Meanwhile,unexpected cashdividendshave amarginallypositive contribution to
cumulativestockabnormal returns.Theresultsareconsistentwithpast literature Ͳ that




the cumulative abnormal return, but the unexpected cash dividends from firms with
different typesofUCSs lead todivergentcumulativestockabnormalreturn.Specifically,










peckingorder theoryor the free cash flowhypothesis. Further, this chapterexplores a
potential quadratic relationship between cash dividend payouts and future earnings
growth,whichcanbe regardedasacombinationofpeckingorder theoryand freecash



















research, dividend policy is associated with firm valuation and corporate governance
mechanisms.Theresultssuggestthatdividendpolicymanifests itselfasamechanismto
mitigatethefreecashflowproblemandimprovetheefficiencyofoperationsintheChinese
market. Importantly, dividend policy is affected by the ownership structure and
consequentlyexertsaninfluenceontheoperatingperformanceandfirmvaluation.These













second part of Section 2.3 elaborates on the signalling hypothesis of cash dividends,
whereasthelastpartofSection2.3discussestherelationshipbetweendividendpolicyand
ultimate controlling shareholders. Section 2.4 reviews the literature on the dividend
announcementeffect,whichiscomprisedoftwopartsͲthetheoreticalviewpointsandthe
empirical evidence. Section 2.5 deals with the second theme, the research on the
relationshipbetweendividendpolicyand futureearningsgrowth,whichconsistsof two

















(1981)document anegative relationbetweenearningsuncertainty andpayout ratio in
crossͲsectionaltests,butasimilarcorrelation isnotobserved inthetimeseriesanalysis.
Moreover,basedonaworldwidefirmͲlevelsample,ChayandSuh (2009)conductcrossͲ
sectional analysis and report a significant negative association between cash flow
uncertainty,proxiedbythevolatilityinstockreturns,andcashpayoutpolicy,includingboth
themagnitudeandpropensityofthecashdividend.
Besides the traditional cashdividendpayout, share repurchasehasbecomemore
popular in recent years. Brav et al. (2005) conducted a survey among 384 financial
executivesandfoundsharerepurchasewaspreferred,notonlybecauseofitsflexibilityin
distributing residual cash flows, but also its function of adjusting the capital structure
instantaneously.Skinner(2008)reportsonlyasmallportionofpublicfirmscontributeto
theaggregatecashdividendpayoutandarguesthatthetraditionalversionoftheLintner
model isunable tocapture theevolution inpayoutpracticebecause thestickydividend








Another cornerstone individend literature is theMillerͲModigliani (MM)dividend
irrelevance theorem. Miller and Modigliani (1961) put forward the theory that









assertion thatonly investmentpolicy contributes to firm value in a frictionlessmarket.
DeAngeloandDeAngelo (2006)posit thatdividendpolicy isas importantas investment
decisionsinfirmvaluation,andtheoptimalpayoutratioiswithinarangeratherthanata













The separation between ownership and control is the source of the agency cost
theoryandmoderncorporationtheoryinfinancialeconomics(Ross,1973).Entrepreneurs
withintelligencecapitalandinvestorswithfinancialcapitalformacollaborativerelationship



















The existence of the agencyͲprincipal relationship installsmanagers as the actual
controllerofthefirm’sassetswhoarelikelytoabusethefreecashflow,whichis‘thecash
flow inexcessof thatrequired to fundallprojects thathavepositivenetpresentvalue’








Crutchley and Hansen (1989) outline three methods to deal with agency cost,







Residual loss is the economic consequence ofmanagers’ decisionswhich fail tomaximize shareholders’








that the firm value is underminedby the sizeofmanagerial equityownership and the
presenceofexternalblockshareholders,becausethesefactorsareinverselyrelatedtothe
levelofdiversification.
Simultaneously, Easterbrook (1984) suggests the divergence in the level of riskͲ
aversionbetween shareholdersandmanagers leads toanother typeofagency cost.As
entrepreneurs’humancapitalandinterestinthefirmislessdiversified,theyaremoreriskͲ
aversethaninvestorswhoprefertakingmorefinancialriskstoexploitthetaxshieldfrom
debts. Similar toRozeff (1982), theprimarymarketwilldisciplinemanagers’behaviour
whentheypursueadditionalexternalequity funds.Even ifnoadditionalexternalequity
capital is needed, a cash distributionwill alleviate the divergence in the risk appetite
betweenshareholdersandentrepreneurs.Bycontrast,BlauandFuller (2008)posit that
corporatemanagement incorporates theoperating flexibility into thedesignofdividend
policy. Fundamentally, the agencyͲprincipal relationship assumesmanagers havemore
expertise than shareholders. By decreasing dividend payments and storing liquidity,
managersobtain flexibilitywhichenables them tobeengaged inprofitable investment
projects, but shareholdersmay not agreewith themanagers’ decision because fewer
dividendsareunappealing.Further,shareholderswillsupplyfurtherequityfundswhenthe








outsideequity.Fluck (1998) investigates the functionofoutsideequityandargues that
agencycostcanbealleviatedbydebtandoutsideequity,becauseinvestorswillevaluate







Unlike Jensen andMeckling (1976),Myers (2000) argues thatmanagerspay cash
dividends to external shareholders in order to extend the agencyͲprincipal contract,
becausethefuturereturnon investment issubjecttomarketuncertainty,andmanagers
areattempting tomitigateanegativeresponse fromshareholders. Inotherwords,cash
dividendsare introducedasamechanism to sortout theagency costas itensures the
investorswillhold the investment longer;andoutsideequitybecomesasupplementary
solutionwhenshareholdersreceivesufficientcashdividends.
The empirical evidence on the agency cost of free cash flow has been widely
documentedinbothdevelopedandemergingmarkets.BornandRimbey(1993)reviewthe
hypothesisinEasterbrook(1984),thatthesignalembeddedinthecashdividendchangeis
ambiguous because it relies on investors’ capability to distinguish growing firms from
disinvestingfirms(i.e.,maturefirms).Theiroutcomesindicatethatfirmswithsubsequent










MercadoͲMendez andWilley (1995) observe that the cash dividend policy of the
bankingindustryispositivelyinfluencedbybanksize,butnegativelyassociatedwithpoor
diversification,whichmeansthemanagementofbankspartiallytakestheagencycostinto





















due to recurringevents.Empirical results suggest investors reactactively to selfͲtender
offersandspecialdividends,butsluggishlytoregulardividendincreasesandsmallspecial
dividends,which supplies evidence to the free cash flow hypothesis that a large cash
distributionistoalleviatetheagencyproblem.
BrockmanandUnlu(2009)lookintothesubstitutionbetweendebtandcashdividend




























action against the management. In other markets, however, the concentration of
ownership and the presence of large shareholders have more impact on corporate
governanceissuesinthosemarkets.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) attempt to develop amodel and explain how a large
minorityshareholdertakestheresponsibilityofmonitoringthecompany’smanagement,
and dealswith the agencyͲprincipal conflictswhen diffusedminority shareholders are
actuallyfreeͲriders.Cashdividendbecomesasubsidytolargeshareholdersbecausethey
needtobecompensatedfortheadditionalmonitoringwork.Subjecttohighermarginaltax
rates,minority shareholders are disadvantagedwhen they receive cash dividends, but







between large shareholders and cashdividendpayouts, their argument targets the tax
clientele effect and does not rule out the possibility of collaboration between large
shareholdersandmanagers.
Jensenetal.(1992)arguethatthecontributionofacashdividendtoalleviateagency
cost is less significantwhen the underlying firm reports a higher percentageof insider









When institutional investors gain significant power in the financial industry, the
function of dividend signalling is not only limited to conveying information on firms’
operationbutisalsoutilizedtoattractinstitutionalinvestors.Allenetal.(2000)pointout





that thepresenceof institutional shareholdersenhances corporategovernanceand the
informationcontentembeddedinthedividendchange.Asinstitutionalinvestorshavethe
expertise to evaluate the performance and quality of listed firms, bad firmswill incur
significant costs if they attempt to improve their reputation bymimicking good firms’
payoutpolicy.Institutionalshareholderswilltakeactionagainstincompetentmanagersby
dumpingtheirshareholdingsandfacilitatingpotentialtakeoveractivities,whentheyreduce








strong. In themeantime,an inverserelationshipbetweenmanagerialshareholdingsand
dividendpayoutisobserved,whichsuppliesevidencetothefreecashflowhypothesis.Khan
(2006) also uses a panel of 300 UK firms between 1985 and 1997 to investigate the
relationship between dividend policy and ownership structures. The result suggests a








Baba (2009) reports that a larger increase in foreign ownership has a positive











property rights can be endorsed, andmitigates the damage to theirwealth caused by
agency costs. In other words, besides the conventional corporate governance
infrastructure,aneffectivelegalsystembecomesabackͲupsolutiontotheagencyproblem.
LaPortaetal.(2000a)conductacrossͲborderanalysisonhowlegalsystemsinfluencethe
dividend policy. Two testable models, ‘outcome model’ and ‘substitute model’, are
developedtoexplorehowfirmsdesigntheirdividendpolicy.The‘outcomemodel’posits
that the dividend policy is an outcome of an effective legal system on the issue of




powerof the legal system to improve the selfͲmotivatedcorporategovernance system.
Ratherthanthecausalrelationship,asproposed inthe ‘outcomemodel’,the ‘substitute
model’ hypothesizes that cash dividends and legal protection are substitutes. The
foundation of this hypothesis is that the subsequent equity finance needs the firm to
establisharemarkablereputationinthecapitalmarketinordertoreceivedecenttreatment






Theempiricalevidence is inclinedtosupportthe ‘outcomemodel’asprovidingstronger
legalprotection (incommon lawregimes)and it isassociatedwithhighercashdividend
payouts.Meanwhile,theyalsoreportasideͲeffectofthisrelationshipwhichisthelower
growth rate in common law regimes, as theminority shareholders aremore likely to
withdrawcashfromthelistedfirmwhichmaywellunderminethelongͲrungrowth.
Farinha and LopezͲdeͲForonda (2009) compare the relationshipbetweendividend
policyandinsiderownershipindifferentlegalregimeswithcivillawandcommonlawlegal
systems. In common law regimes, the cash dividend payout is, in general, negatively
correlatedwith insiderownership inacommon law legalsystem.Duringthisdescending
process,payoutratiowillreboundwhentheinsidershareholdingsaresignificantbutnonͲ
dominating, which reflects the insider shareholders’ attempt to compromise outside
investors’demand fordecreasing the cash controlledby insiderowners.Thepattern is
27
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Adjaoud and BenͲAmar (2010) test whether outcome hypothesis or substitution
hypothesis is more suitable to explain the relationship between dividend policy and
corporategovernancequality,witha sampleof714observations listedon theToronto
StockExchange,and findsupportiveevidencethatdividendpolicy isakindofcorporate
disciplinemechanism.TheyusetheGlobe&Mailannualcorporategovernance index,as
well as four subͲcategory scores Ͳ board composition, shareholding and compensation
issues,shareholderrightsissuesandcorporategovernancedisclosurepolicyͲtoassessthe
robustness of corporate governancemechanisms. Their regression results indicate that
strongcorporategovernance isassociatedwithahigherdividendpayout ratio,which is
similartoFarinhaandLopezͲdeͲForonda’s(2009)findingsonthecommonlawregime.
JirapornandNing(2006)positagencycostsplayadeterminantrolewhenfirmsdesign
adividendpolicy,byexamining the associationbetweendividends and the strengthof
shareholderrights.ContrarytoLaPortaetal.(2000a),theirempiricalevidenceisinclined
to underpin the substitutionmodel, that is, there is an inverse relationship between
dividend payout and shareholder rights. Firmswould announce higher dividendswhen
shareholderrightsaremuchweaker,asthemanagementneedstoconvincethemarketthat





be suitable for markets where the shareholding is widely dispersed. In fact, the
phenomenonofshareholdingconcentrationiswidelyseeninmarketsotherthanUKand
US.GuglerandYurtoglu (2003)contend that thechange individendpayout reflects the
severityoftheconflictbetweenlargeandsmallshareholders.Withasampleof266German
listedcompanies,theyfindthatthepayoutwillbereducedwhenthelargestshareholder
increases itsstake,but is increasedwhen thesecond largestshareholderacquiresmore
outstandingshares.Thefirstresultindicatesthefreecashflowproblemdeterioratesasthe
largestshareholderhasmorevoting rights,while thesecondphenomenonsuggests the
second largestshareholderattemptstochallengethe largestshareholder’smonopolyon
thefirm’sfinancialresources.
Besidesthe levelofshareholdings,Gugler (2003)contends that the identityofthe
largestshareholder influencestheunderlying firm’spayoutpolicy.Gugler (2003)defines
the four types of largest shareholders as families, banks, foreign investors and state
governments, because they have unique backgrounds and interests. A system of
simultaneousequations isapplied to thepaneldataof214nonͲfinancialAustrian firms
between 1991 and 1999. Significant divergence among the different types of largest
shareholders is documented. The listed firm with a state government as the largest
shareholder smooths the dividend policy, while familyͲcontrolled firms exhibit more
volatility inthedividendpayoutandaremore likelytocutcashdividends.ThedividendͲ







payoutpattern significantly. Investors inboth European andEasternAsian firms tightly
affiliatedwith single large shareholders receivemore cashdividends,because they are
awareof thepotential forexpropriation.When theaffiliation is loose, though, thecash
dividendsofEuropeanfirmsarenotaffected,whereassimilarAsianfirmsreducetheircash
payout becausemultiple large shareholders, also known as ‘parties acting in concert’,
collaborateandexacerbatetheexpropriation.
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2007), using UK panel data, investigate whether
corporatecontrolstructureinfluencesthedividendpolicy.Theirresultsshowasignificant
negativerelationshipbetweenthelargestshareholders’votingrightsandpayoutratios,and










flow is negatively correlatedwith the cash rights held by the largest shareholder, but
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nonͲnegotiable shares on both the magnitude and likelihood of cash dividend
announcementswith a samplebetween1994and2006.All these studies attribute the


















becauseexternal stakeholders lackdetailed informationabout the firmapart from that





the announcement ofdividend changeswill be used to assess shareprice.Based on a
sampleof625dividendchangeannouncementsbetween1964and1968,theauthorfinds











capitalgain. Intuitively, investors responddifferentlybasedon thedirectionofnews.A
positivecashdividendshockordividend initiation isviewedasasignalofthemanager’s
optimism about future cash flow, while a lowerͲthanͲexpected cash dividend
announcement shows themanagers’ lackof confidence.The argument inBhattacharya











ofmeasurementerror in the abnormal return.On theotherhand,Divecha andMorse
(1983)alsodocumentasignificantstockabnormalreturnwhenthereisanincreaseincash
dividends,buttheirsampleisrestrictedtoashorterwindowfrom1977to1979.
Woolridge (1982) attempts to investigate the information content of dividend
changes independent from the investors’ expectation on dividends and the noise of




and 376 dividend change announcements, and the regression results indicate dividend
shocks are positively related to cumulative abnormal return, which supports the
informationcontenthypothesisofdividends.
Benesh et al. (1984) supply further empirical evidence on the hypothesis that
managers transmitprivate informationby theirdesignofdividendpolicy.Basedon the
sampleofsubstantialchangesincashdividends(initiation,omissionandnolessthan25%
change), the summary statistics of cumulative abnormal returns indicate that negative
dividend shocks have a prominent downward impact on stock prices even though the





aroundtheeventwindow ismore likelyto increase.Theirempiricalresultssupporttheir
hypothesisof increasedsystematic risk,but thisspike inbetadoesnot fullyexplain the
excess return across the event window. Following this thread of logic, Kalay and
Loewenstein(1986)positthatthetimingofadividendannouncementiskeytoexplaining
theannouncementeffect,becausemanagement,asinvestorsexpect,wouldpostponethe
announcement of a dividend decrease (i.e., bad news). They report that the level of




GhoshandWoolridge (1988) find shareholdersaremore sensitive toadownward
changeindividends.TheirmultiͲvariableregressionsuggeststhatthelevelofdecreasein

















dividendannouncements. In linewithprevious literature,theyreportthattheabnormal
returnismoresignificantinthecaseofdividendomissionannouncementsthaninthoseof
dividend initiation announcements.With a sample of 561 dividend initiations and 887
dividendomissions, theydocumentsustaineddrifts insharepricewhichcontinue inthe
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than that followingearnings shocks.Theyapplya trading strategybasedon theaboveͲ
mentionedmomentumofdividendshockswitha longͲshortstrategyandthesimulation
showsplausiblepositivereturnsin22outof25years.
Lee (1995) also investigates the response of stock prices to dividend shocks. The
methodologyusedisabivariatemodelofstockpricesandpriceͲdividendspreads.Different
fromprevious researchdesigns, Lee (1995)models thedividend as a combinationof a
permanentcomponentandatemporarycomponent,whicharelinkedtostockpricesviaa
stockpricevaluationmodel.The initial responsesofstockprice tobothpermanentand
temporary shocks are significantly strong. Further, the priceͲdividend spreads can be
explainedbythetemporaryshocksindividends,whichindicatethatlargeswingsinshare
pricesarecausedbytemporaryshocks.Theauthorarguesthatadividendisanimperfect












on share repurchase thanon traditionalcashdividends to transmitprivate information.
Choi and Chen (1997) report that the abnormal return caused by stock repurchase
announcements is much larger than that of dividend increase announcements, after
controllingforidiosyncraticfactors.Itisalsofoundthatsharerepurchaseannouncements
aremore likelytobe followedbyasignificantdrop insystematicriskandbetterratings
issued by financial analysts. Some survey results also suggest managers prefer share
repurchasebecauseofitsflexibility(Bravetal.,2005).Changesindividendshavebecome
lessinformativethantheyusedtobethreedecadesago,partlyduetothefactthatinvestors




Different from Kalay and Loewenstein’s (1985) study which posits a shortͲrun





that those firms with increased dividends are inclined to freeze their investment




sharepriceperformance in thenext threeyears,which isexplainedasa change in the
systematicrisk(i.e.,overͲestimationonexpectedreturn).
Similar studieshavebeen conductedondevelopedmarketsother than in theUS.








found that stock abnormal returns of Spanish listed firms are sensitive to dividend
announcement,butnotfullyexplainedbydividendsignallinghypotheses.Instead,theyare




developed and developingmarkets, although they are not a cash distribution. Charest
(1978b) reports that theexcess return in the threemonthsafter stock splits (i.e., stock
dividend) issignificantlydifferentfromzero.Grinblattetal. (1984)reportthatthereare





in cash dividends, the announcement effect can be interpreted by several signalling
hypotheses.Oneof them is the ‘retainedearningshypothesis’, that is, the reduction in
retainedearnings(equity)duetostockdividends19announcementsuggestsmanagement’s
confidence in future cash flows. In other words, the strong expectation of the firm’s
operationisthefoundationforthestockdividenddecision.Theothersignallinghypothesis



















Researchon thedividend announcementeffect inemergingmarketshasbecome
popular in recent years. Chen et al. (2002) investigate the information content of the
concurrent earnings, stock dividend and cash dividend announcement in the Chinese
market.Basedona sampleof1,232observations, their results suggest stockabnormal
return is more associated with earnings announcements than cash dividend
announcements.Stockdividendannouncementsappeartoworkascatalyststoearnings






dividends is positively correlated with stock abnormal return in the Chinese market.
Different from the traditional signalling hypothesis, they find that a positive abnormal
returnisreportedafterbothincreasesanddecreasesincashdividends.Theimplicationis
thatinvestorswelcomecashdividendsandareindifferenttothechangeindividends.Their
crossͲsectional analysis suggests that both cash dividend yield and the ratio of nonͲ
negotiablesharesinfluencetheannouncementeffectofcashdividendchanges.Theyalso
acknowledge that thepatternof announcementeffect changes significantlydue to the
implementationofsomeadministrativeorders.
Chengetal.(2009)adoptadifferentmeasurementofinformationcontentembedded





from unexpected dividends. Instead, the change in stock dividend per share shows a
significant contribution to abnormal return around the announcement period, which




etal. (2007) test the informationcontentofsimultaneousearningsannouncementsand
dividendsannouncements in theHongKongmarket.The listed firms in the sampleare
groupedbasedonfirmͲspecificfeatures,suchasconcentratedcontrolrightsheldbyfamily,
insufficientcorporatetransparencyandtaxͲfreecashdividends.Theirresultsindicatestock





earnings and dividend announcements. Their findings support the signalling hypothesis
because insiderswouldbuy (sell)beforegood (bad)news.Theyalsoreportasignificant
correlationbetweenpreͲeventinsidertradingbehaviourandtheannouncementeffect.





Exchange, in order to test the semiͲstrong efficient market hypothesis. Their sample
consistsof120firmslistedontheMainBoardofBursaMalaysia,whichreportedearnings
anddividendannouncements in2006.Theabnormalreturnsaround theannouncement
datearepositive (negative)when there isadividend increase (decrease),whichcanbe
mainlyattributedtotheinformationcontentembeddedinthecashdividend.
Ali and Chowdhury (2010) look into the stock price reactions to cash dividend
announcements in the private commercial banks of Bangladesh, and testwhether the
informationcontent issignificant.Theyconductastandardeventstudyon thedividend
announcement of 25 listed banks. The cumulative abnormal returns around the event
window indicate little investor response to the announcements. They conclude that














earningsand themarketvalueof the firm.Watts (1973) tests thehypothesis that cash
dividends contain information about the firm’s future earnings. The regression results




simultaneous cash dividend announcements and seasoned equity offerings. A taxable
dividend acts as an information source about the firm’s future earnings,which is not
unveiledthroughperiodicannouncements.Withtheexistenceofasymmetricinformation,
the transaction cost attached to theequity issuingprocess and the tax related to cash
dividend payments are the elements which distinguish good firms from bad. The
managementhastheincentivetosignalthegoodnewsbecausemanagerialshareholdings
would benefit from investors’ reaction to positive dividend shocks. This signalling
equilibrium still holdswhenmultiple signals, such as share repurchase and investment
plans,arepresentedtothemarket(Williams,1988).
Bycontrast,MillerandRock(1985)proposeamodelfocusingonconsistentsignalling
equilibrium in conditions of asymmetric information and share trading, inwhich cash
dividendannouncementsworkaseffectivesignals.InMillerandRock’s(1985)framework,
thepositivecashdividendshockisnotalwaystreatedasanencouragingsignalifthesource














dividend isdisbursedfrom internal fundswithnoneedtoseekadditionalequitycapital.
OferandSiegel(1987)useanalysts’earningsforecastsastheproxyofmarketexpectation
andreportthatanalystsare likely toreviseuptheir forecastwhenunexpecteddividend
changeshitthemarket.




analysts aremore likely to update their forecasts of current earnings after a dividend








al. (1996) findchanges incashdividendsdonot indicatechanges in futureearningsand
capitalexpenditure.
Similarly,NoeandRebello(1996)focusonmanagerialoptimismandhow itaffects
the firm’s dividend policy, subsequent equity financing and investment policy. They
documentthatdividendpolicyandsubsequentequityfinancingbecomeanidealsignalling
mechanismwhenadverseselectionandmanagerialoptimismcoͲexist.Intheiropinion,the
signalling functionofdividend changeneeds some supplementary conditionswhen the







in thedividend announcement.With robustnonparametricmethodologies, they report
thattheabovementionedpositivecorrelationdoesexist,butitisnotconsistentasthelevel
of the dividend signal changes,which suggests that existing signallingmodels are not
universallyapplicable.
BechmannandRaaballe(2010)developaclassofsignallingmodelsandlookintothe







is that good firms derive more marginal benefit from investment than bad firms.
Consequently,theopportunitycostofcuttingbackinvestmentwouldbemuchhigherfor
good firms. Therefore, the costͲbenefit of cash distribution as a signal should be
reconsideredbythemanagement.
A greatdealofempirical research about the signalling functionof cashdividends
concentrateson the special casesofdividend initiationandomission,because theyare
deemed tocontainmore informationabout theexpected futurecash flow.Asquithand
Mullins(1983)utilizeasampleof168firmswithindependentannouncementsofdividend
initiation, or dividend resumption after halting for 10 years, and document significant































analysts are more likely to revise the earnings forecast after dividend change
announcements.Differentfromwhatishypothesizedintheagencycostoffreecashflow,
firms’dividendchangeannouncementispositivelycorrelatedwiththefollowingchangein

















design thestockdividendannouncementwiththe full insightoftheirown firms.Similar
resultsarealsoreportedinLakonishokandLev’s(1987)researchwhichconductsempirical
analysis on themotivation of stock splits or stock dividend decisions, and the positive
market reaction to that news. Besides the normal pursuit to restore share prices to a
‘normalrange’,LakonishokandLev(1987)findsomesupportiveevidenceofthesignalling
motive of stock splits, but attribute the intention of stock dividends to an attempt to
substituteitforarelativelysmallcashdividend.
McNichols and Dravid (1990) supply further evidence that management signals




returns are highly correlated with split factors. Consequently, investors update their
evaluationofthefirms’valuebasedontheprivateinformationconveyedviasplitfactors.
Their analysis also indicates that the abnormal return around stock dividend
announcementsisstillsignificantlycorrelatedwithsplitfactors,evenafterearningsforecast
errorsareincludedinthecontrolvariables.Itimplies,too,thattheinformationcontentin




increase the probability of raising external capital in the future,which results inmore
financialcost.Gordon(1962)proposesthesharepricevaluationmodelwhichonlytakes















which managers prefer internal finance (i.e., retained earnings) to external finance.
Accordingtothepeckingordertheory,firmswillbenefitfromthecheaperfundingcostif










the pecking order theory works quite well in explaining the firm’s financial decisions




market and examine the relationship between dividend adjustments and subsequent
operatingperformance.Differingfrompreviousresearch,theydevelopapredictivemodel
of conditionaldividendadjustment.They show that thechange individend ispositively






posits that cash dividend payouts and future earnings growth are positively correlated
becauseofthedividendsignalling.HealyandPalepu(1988)suggestthatpositive(negative)
earnings growth is associated with the decision of initiating (omitting) dividends.
Meanwhile,changesinthesubsequentearningsgrowtharepositivelycorrelatedwiththe
announcementperiodabnormal return,which indicates investors’ captureof the signal
embeddedinthecashdividendannouncement.Itisalsounderpinnedbytheevidencethat
the share price reaction to subsequent earnings announcements is less significant, as
investors are aware of the upcoming change implied in the previous dividend
announcement.
Benartzietal. (1997)arguethatthechange incashdividenddoesnot indicatethe
changeinfutureearnings.Theychallengethetraditionalimplicationthatthechangeincash
dividendssignals the futureperformance.Firms that increasedividends reportedstrong
performanceinthecurrentandpreviousyear,butdonotexhibitsuperiorearningsgrowth
in the subsequent year. Instead, firmswhich cutdividends are inclined to show robust
earnings growth in the following year.Consistentwith Lintner (1956), they report that
dividendͲincreasingfirmsaremorelikelytoavoidadropinfutureearnings,althoughthe
sizeofthedividendincreasesisnotaneffectiveparametertoforecastfutureearnings.Their
empirical results also show that dividend increasing firms report modestly positive
abnormalreturnsinthefollowingthreeyears.InreplytoBenartzietal.(1997),Nissimand










outcomes to the signallinghypothesis thatmanagementconveys informationabout the
firm’soperationbychangesinthedividend.21
Meanwhile, following Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986), some
researchersargue thatalthough the reduction in thecashbalanceasa resultofpaying
dividendsmay increase the fundingcost, italsomitigates theagencycostandprevents
management fromselfͲdealingactivitiesatthecostofshareholders’wealth (i.e.,agency
cost).22Because cashdividendworksasamechanism tomonitor themanagement, the
futureearningsgrowthwillbenefitfromthecashdividendpayment.Therefore,apositive
correlationmaywellexistbetweencurrentcashdividendsandfutureearningsgrowth.
ArnottandAsness (2003) investigatewhether the cashdividendpayout isagood
predictoroffutureearningsgrowth.InsteadoffirmͲleveldata,theyusetheS&P500Index
because the earnings growth and average dividend payout ratioof aportfolio are less
affectedthanthetemporaryanomaliesofindividualfirms.Theirdescriptiveandregression









for these results is themonitoring functionof cashdividendonmanagement’sempireͲ
buildingactivities.
Gwilym et al. (2006) extend the research to 11 regimes in the Organization for
EconomicCoͲoperationandDevelopment(OECD),includingtheUS.FollowingArnottand
Asness (2003), they also use the index portfolio payout level instead of firm payout.
AlthoughthecountryͲspecificfeaturesaredivergent,theirregressionresultsaregenerally
consistentwithwhathasbeendocumentedinArnottandAsness(2003),thatis,apositive
























mechanism to dealwith agency cost (i.e., the free cash flow problem),while a stock
dividend istosignalmanagement’sconfidence inthefutureperformance(i.e.,signalling










to mitigate agency cost. Apart from the traditional definition of agency cost, the





controlling shareholders andminority shareholders. Controlling shareholders have the




the background of the controllers. The existing literature is inclined to support the
viewpointthatconcentratedownershipwillprovidearemedytoagencycosts,however,
whetherornot this viewpoint is applicable in emergingmarketsneedsmore empirical
research,becausetheagencycost,especiallythefreecashflowproblem,ismoreprominent
inemergingmarkets.
Second, it isdocumentedthatdividendpolicyconveysprivate informationheldby
insiders. Themagnitude and significance of the announcement effect reflectswhether
investorsacceptthesignals.Ingeneral,testingtheannouncementeffect isequivalentto
testing the efficientmarket hypothesis. Existingmodels use either changes in the cash
dividendorunexpectedcashdividends tomeasure the informationcontentofdividend










more likely to abuse the financial resources of a firm under their control. Paying cash
dividendswoulddecrease the free cash flows and lessen theprobabilityof conducting
negativeͲNPVprojects.Accordingtotraditionalthought,thesubsequentearningsgrowthis
relatedtocostofcapital,whichcanbedecreasedbymoreretentionandlower/fewercash
payouts. Therefore, the traditional school of thought proposes a negative correlation
between payout ratio and subsequent earnings growth. Recent empirical studies have















theͲcounter market for trading the outstanding common shares was established in
September1986,andthefirstsecuritiescompany,ShanghaiWanguoSecuritiesCompany,
wasfoundedin1988.25
All the above events were only initial experiments to explore the feasibility of
establishingacapitalmarketinChina.TheslowprogressinthedevelopmentoftheChinese
capitalmarketwasmainlyduetothepoliticaldebateaboutpublicownershipinasocialist















One importantmission of the Chinese equitymarket is to convert stateͲowned
companiestomodernenterprisesthroughpartialshareissuanceprivatization(SIP).Since
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difference determines that the capitalͲraising function of the Chinese stock market
overrides its investment function in order to support the economic reforms,which is
criticizedbymarketparticipantsasthelistedfirmsaremoreadvantagedthantheminority
investors.Thissituationhaschangedsince theSecuritiesLawwaspromulgated in1997,
which sets up the securities regulatory framework and justifies CSRC’s position as the
regulator of the securities industry.30 Furthermore, CSRC encourages the interaction
betweentheChinesestockmarketandglobalequitymarkets.Ontheonehand,moreand
moreChinesecompaniesarelistinginoverseasmarkets,companiessuchasPeople’sLife
Insurance Company of China, Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sino
PetroleumCorporation (Sinopec) andChinaNationalOffshoreOilCorporation (CNOOC)
while,ontheotherhand,theChineseequitymarkethasbeenconditionallyopentoforeign






















Another crucialmilestonewas the split share structure reform (SSSR) in2005.As
mentioned, the partial SIP in the early stages of the Chinese equitymarket created a
significantportionofnonͲnegotiable stateͲowned sharesand legalperson shares33 that
became a barrier to further development in the stock market, as the controlling
shareholdersexploited theiradvantagewith themajorityvoting rights.Effectively,SSSR




33 NonͲnegotiable stateͲowned shares can be transferred and/or sold to stateͲowned and/or private
corporations,whichbecomelegalpersonshares.
34Thehigh IPOprice inthepartialSIPcausedproblemsbecause itwastheconsideration forstateͲowned










































bigͲfour stateͲowned banks became listed firms by the end of 2010.38 The successful

















TheChinese legal infrastructure isclassifiedasacivil lawsystemandthe lawsthat
regulatetheChinesestockmarketincludetheSecuritiesLaw,CorporationLaw,andIncome




investors to getmore involved in the Chinesemarket and tomonitor the corporate




























and tradingofvarioussecurities, financial institutions,stockexchanges,clearinghouses,
andtheregulator.
TheissuanceandtradingofsecuritiesusedtobecoveredbytheCorporationLawuntil


















tostimulate listedfirmsto improvetheirperformanceandrewardthe investors,butthe
unintended consequence is thatmany listed firms conductaccountingmanipulations in
ordertowindowͲdresstheirfinancialstatementsandmaintaintheirlistedstatus.
Inaddition, theSecuritiesLawmandates thecontinuous informationdisclosureof
listed firms.Besides theperiodic financial statements, listed firmshave todisclose any
change in the name and shareholdingsof the top 10 shareholders, thedirect/ultimate

























The taxation issue is critical to the researchon cashdividendpolicy,as thereare
differencesamongthemarginalincometaxratesofvariousinvestorswhichleadstotheir




















































other company policies, such as the investment plan, rather than the popular ‘sticky’
dividendpayoutpolicyindevelopedmarkets.ThetightcontrolontheIPOquotaimposed











In response to the growing dissatisfaction of negotiable shareholders, CSRC has
imposedseveralregulations,includingthecontentcoveringthecashdividenddistribution,





of theChineseequitymarket.Themotivation for thisdiscriminative treatmentcouldbe
attributed to the fact thatminority shareholdersprefer stockdividends and controlling
shareholdersprefercashdistributions.49Therefore,CSRCpublished‘NoticeofSeveralIssues
aboutStandardizing thePracticeofListedCompanies’ in1996,which specified that this
discriminative practice should be terminated immediately and all shareholders should
receive the same type of dividends.50Meanwhile, in the same documentation, CSRC
requiredlistedcompaniestospecifythesourceofthestockdividend,ascomingfromeither
capitalreservesorfromretainedearnings.
CSRC announced ‘Measures for the Administration of Share Issuance by Listed
Companies’in2001,whichattemptedtolinkthedividendpayoutwiththeapprovalofnew
shares issuance.CSRCrequired theunderwriter toprepareaduediligencereportwhich














firms to emphasize the payback to investors and include the general policy of profit
distributioninthecorporatecharter.Theboardofdirectorshastoannouncedistribution






and/or stock dividends. Thisminimum payout ratio for issuance of new securitieswas





has to include the current profit distribution plan in the financial statement. If no
distribution isproposedbutretainedearningsarepositive,theboardofdirectorshasto
explainthezerocashdistributiondecisionandhowtheretainedearningswillbeused.















Total NeverPay Discretional 2–4years 5–9years 10–14years 15Ͳ19years
1,657 70 908 399 200 78 2


































set of practicalmeans to improve profit distribution. Since 2006, when ‘Measures of
SecurityIssuancebyListedCompanies’waspublishedandsetthethresholdofthe3Ͳyear


















































































































agency costof free cash flow isquite significant in theChinesemarket.Someprevious
literaturehascoveredthisarea,buttheresultsareinconclusive.Therefore,thefollowing
threechapterswilllookintotheconnectionbetweendividendpracticeandseveralissues








Agency problems caused by the conflict of interest between shareholders and
managershasbeenstudiedthoroughlyundertheAngloͲAmericancorporategovernance
infrastructurewhich has dispersed ownership,where the cash dividend payout can be
viewedasashareholders’tooltotackletheprincipalͲagentproblem(JensenandMeckling,
1976, Rozeff, 1982, Jensen, 1986). This structure contrastswith recent studies on the






large shareholders, and alleviates minority shareholders’ concern about wealth
expropriation.54However, a high cash payoutdoes not necessarilymitigate, but rather











This chapter investigates whether the control rights of the ultimate controlling
shareholders of a listed firm in China influence the firm’s cash dividend policy.Most




secondarymarket,whichmakes itmoreattractive to realize their investment returnby




started thesplitsharestructurereform (SSSR) in2005,aiming tomake listed firms fully
floatedinthesecondarymarket.Attheendof2012,morethan99percentofChineselisted
firmshavecompletedtheSSSR.56AstheseparationbetweennegotiableandnonͲnegotiable
shares gradually phases out, the special feature of nonͲnegotiable shares, such as the
preferencetocashdividend(Chengetal.,2009),willdisappearaccordingly.


















shareholders,aswellas thepercentageofvoting (control) rightsunder theircontrol, in
annual financial statements. In addition, when there is any change in the ultimate





















operating performance of Chinese listed firms, in which they define UCSs into four
categories,BureauofStateͲownedAssets(SAMB),58StateͲownedEnterprisesaffiliatedto
Central Government (SOECG), StateͲowned Enterprises affiliated to Local Government
(SOELG), and Private investors (Private).59 They argue that these UCSs have different





















60Althoughacashdividend is subject to income tax, institutional shareholdershaveanadvantageas the













the listed firm, as it reflects the affiliation amongmultiple large shareholders and is
independent from any change in regulations on the negotiability of common shares.
Second,thepopularcategorizationbasedonstateͲprivateinvestorsintheChinesemarket
maynotbe sufficient asdifferent typesof stateͲownedUCSshavedivergentoperating


























has no influence on the firm’s valuation in a frictionless capital market (Miller and
Modigliani,1961), thepractice surrounding the cashdividendpolicy results inplentiful
academicresearchtoanswerthequestionofwhypubliccompaniespayacashdividend.
Because of the separation between ownership and management in AngloͲAmerican
markets,entrepreneursinpublicfirmshavethemotivationtomakedecisionsinfavourof
themselves but at the cost of shareholders, which is defined as the agencyͲprincipal
problem(JensenandMeckling,1976).Hence,thecashdividendpolicyisconjecturedtobe
acorporategovernancemechanismtoreducethefreecashflowandmonitorthemanagers









large shareholders’wealthexpropriation from theminority shareholders.Some studies,
suchasFaccioetal.(2001),Baeetal.(2002),Vladimir(2005),Baeketal.(2006),andJiang
etal.(2010),documentsignificantexpropriationactivities,whileotherstudiesarguethat
the practice of large shareholders in EastAsianmarkets swings between expropriating
minority shareholders’wealth and propping up the listed firm (Friedman et al., 2003,
Cheungetal.,2006,Howetal.,2008,Cheungetal.,2009a,Chenetal.,2011).
Moststudiesonthecashdividendpayout intheChinesemarketarebasedonthe
uniqueownershipstructurecreatedby thepartialshare issuanceprivatization (SIP) that
separates the nonͲnegotiable shares from negotiable shares.61 As the Chinese capital
marketevolves,somesophisticated investorsutilizetheconcentrationofnonͲnegotiable
shareholdings to control listed firmswith amultipleͲtier shareholding structure. These
investors become the soͲcalled ultimate controlling shareholders and benefit from
tunnellingresourcesfromlistedcompanies,suchastransferringpriceandinterͲcompany
loan guarantees, with their dominating voting rights. The lack of minority investor

61Initially,nonͲnegotiableshareswereequivalenttostateͲownedshares,whilenegotiablesharesweresold








Wang et al., 2008, Jiang et al., 2009,Ng et al., 2009). Due to the tightening of CSRC
regulationsontunnellingbehaviours,cashdividendsareregardedasajustifiedmeansto
realizeinvestmentreturnandextractfundsfromthecontrolledlistedfirms.Intuitively,a
higher levelofcontrolrightswill facilitateUCSsto increaseboththepropensityandthe
magnitudeofcontrolledentities’cashdividendpayouts.




aforementioned positive relationship between nonͲnegotiable shareholdings and cash















Hypothesis 4.1 The level of control rights held by UCSs positively influences both the
propensityandmagnitudeofthecashdividend.










maintain and increase the value of stateͲowned assets. SOECGs include stateͲowned
enterprises under the direct control of central government agencies,which havewide
autonomy and are able to form conglomerates by investing in other listed companies.
SOELGsaredifferentfromSOECGsastheyarecontrolleddirectlybymunicipalgovernments
andwere created tomanage the spinͲoffs from the stateͲownedenterprisespreviously
ownedbycentralgovernment.Theprivateinvestmentinstitutionsandindividualinvestors
aredefinedasPrivateUCSs.Intuitively,PrivateUCSsaremoreprofitͲorientedbuthaveless
support from the stateͲcontrolled financial sector,whichmakes themmore inclined to
extractcash fromthecontrolled listed firms.Therefore, it is likelythatPrivateUCSswill




and commitmentsbeyondeconomicprofits.As SAMBUCSs areeffectively government
agenciesandthedirectorsappointedbySAMBUCSsarepublicservants,theyhavetheleast
interest inexploitingtheeconomicbenefit fromthe listed firms. Instead,theyaremore
committedtosupportthegovernmenttoadministratethesociety.Dissimilarly,SOECGand
SOELGUCSsareincorporatedlegalpersonswhicharemorefocusedontheprofitandloss








firmscontrolledbySOECGUCSsare thebestperformers (Chenetal.,2009c), it is likely
SOECGUCSsareunderpressuretoorganisethecontrolledlistedfirmstodistributemore
cashdividends.Hence,thesecondhypothesisisproposedasbelow:










































measured as the aggregate direct and indirect shareholdings, controlled by UCSs,
CONTROL_RIGHTS, is introduced as a key independent variable that measures the




known as the agency cost of free cash flow. Meanwhile, a dummy variable,
Dummy_LowControl,isincludedasaparameterforlowcontrolrights,whichequalsto1if
CONTROL_RIGHTSislessthan20percent,and0otherwise.AccordingtoCSMARdatabase,
some firms report ultimate controlling shareholders with lower percentage of control
rights.The inclusionofDummy_LowControl is to control forobservationwith lowͲlevel
controlrightsanditscoefficientisexpectedtobeoppositetothatofCONTROL_RIGHTS.
Asetofdummyvariables,UCS_Dummy, includingDPrivate,DSOECG,DSOELGand









types follows the ‘Classification Standard forRelatedPartyNatureofEnterprise’of the
‘China listed firm’s shareholder research database’ published by CSMAR. UCSs with
classification codes 2111 (StateͲowned Assets Supervision Administration Commission),
2121 (Bureau of StateͲowned Assets, directly under the Provincial and Regional





2131) are defined as SOELG.UCSswith classification codes in categories 1200 (Private






 Private SOECG SOELG SAMB
 No. % No. % No. % No. %
PanelA:Wholesample  
6,386 2,146 33.6 442 6.9 1,010 15.8 2,788 43.7
PanelB:CashͲpayer  

















2008). As larger firms aremore likely tomake dividend payouts and paymore cash
dividends, it isexpected that thecoefficientonSIZEwillbepositive.ThePrice_to_Book

















































dividends (Crutchley and Jensen, 1999, Chen et al., 2005b, Eije andMegginson, 2008,














Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics of dependent variables and key
independentvariablesused in this chapter.As shown inPanelA, theaverage (median)
payoutratioofcashpayers is38.80percent (35.29%),slightly lowerthantheresultsof
other markets (Truong and Heaney, 2007). The average control rights held by UCSs,















PanelA:Wholesample       
Variable Mean S.D. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
CASH_PAYOUT(cashpayers) 0.3880 0.2170 0.1363 0.2180 0.3529 0.5184 0.7091
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2578 0.2546 0.0000 0.0000 0.2160 0.4294 0.6297
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4019 0.1567 0.1997 0.2765 0.3959 0.5189 0.6156
CASH_RIGHTS 0.3443 0.1778 0.1176 0.2017 0.3228 0.4806 0.6009
PRICE_TO_BOOK 3.1812 2.2635 1.1495 1.5885 2.4848 4.0678 6.1039
FREE_CF Ͳ0.3948 0.5446 Ͳ1.1520 Ͳ0.6716 Ͳ0.2474 0.0000 0.1220
ROE 0.0916 0.0635 0.0188 0.0436 0.0812 0.1254 0.1760
LEVERAGE 0.5966 0.5328 0.0367 0.1911 0.4644 0.8584 1.3155
Private       
CASH_PAYOUT(cashpayers) 0.3743 0.2189 0.1219 0.2003 0.3346 0.5105 0.6996
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2479 0.2512 0.0000 0.0000 0.1970 0.4173 0.6294
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.3522 0.1473 0.1750 0.2386 0.3248 0.4500 0.5703
CASH_RIGHTS 0.2567 0.1577 0.0771 0.1289 0.2308 0.3569 0.4890
PRICE_TO_BOOK 3.7173 2.4652 1.2871 1.8719 3.0845 4.8389 7.0276
FREE_CF Ͳ0.4136 0.5445 Ͳ1.1815 Ͳ0.7132 Ͳ0.2651 0.0000 0.1158
ROE 0.0972 0.0608 0.0249 0.0540 0.0885 0.1309 0.1720
LEVERAGE 0.5270 0.4750 0.0233 0.1649 0.4223 0.7640 1.1497
PanelB:subgroupswithcertaintypeofUCS
SOECG       
CASH_PAYOUT(cashpayers) 0.3891 0.2329 0.1158 0.1978 0.3537 0.5107 0.7498
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2799 0.2639 0.0000 0.0000 0.2281 0.4452 0.6812
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4071 0.1769 0.1739 0.2525 0.4013 0.5429 0.6500
CASH_RIGHTS 0.3570 0.1935 0.1209 0.1972 0.3178 0.5012 0.6456
PRICE_TO_BOOK 3.1894 2.1917 1.3062 1.7324 2.4587 3.8777 5.8776
FREE_CF Ͳ0.3556 0.5084 Ͳ1.0162 Ͳ0.6128 Ͳ0.2401 0.0000 0.1132
ROE 0.0901 0.0639 0.0219 0.0466 0.0746 0.1213 0.1760
LEVERAGE 0.5416 0.5111 0.0139 0.1774 0.4252 0.7502 1.0763
SOELG       
CASH_PAYOUT(cashpayers) 0.4448 0.2216 0.1748 0.2661 0.4106 0.5982 0.7868
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2713 0.2776 0.0000 0.0000 0.2310 0.4698 0.6744
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4201 0.1568 0.2267 0.2981 0.4195 0.5455 0.6312
CASH_RIGHTS 0.3893 0.1711 0.1638 0.2563 0.3861 0.5234 0.6302
PRICE_TO_BOOK 2.7067 1.7675 1.1703 1.5210 2.1664 3.4038 4.7166
FREE_CF Ͳ0.3748 0.5148 Ͳ1.0484 Ͳ0.6287 Ͳ0.2417 0.0000 0.1214
ROE 0.0781 0.0557 0.0142 0.0366 0.0683 0.1078 0.1511
LEVERAGE 0.6147 0.4898 0.0653 0.2353 0.5098 0.8990 1.2978
SAMB       
CASH_PAYOUT(cashpayers) 0.3795 0.2083 0.1401 0.2162 0.3469 0.5029 0.6823
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2570 0.2467 0.0000 0.0000 0.2226 0.4237 0.6046
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4328 0.1508 0.2240 0.3155 0.4400 0.5448 0.6310
CASH_RIGHTS 0.3934 0.1663 0.1817 0.2607 0.3812 0.5260 0.6212
PRICE_TO_BOOK 2.9393 2.1927 1.0391 1.4403 2.2535 3.6955 5.6696
FREE_CF Ͳ0.3939 0.5603 Ͳ1.1869 Ͳ0.6600 Ͳ0.2325 0.0000 0.1283
ROE 0.0925 0.0674 0.0168 0.0399 0.0788 0.1292 0.1890





of UCSs. CashͲpayers with SOELG (Private) UCSs exhibit the highest (lowest) mean
CASH_PAYOUT, but the pattern turns upsideͲdown in the comparison of ROE and
91
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The Pearson’s correlation matrix of nonͲdummy dependent variables and
independent variables is shown in Table 4.4. The correlation coefficient between
CASH_PAYOUT and CONTROL_RIGHTS is significantly positive, indicating that the coͲ
movement between control rights and cash payout ratio is in the same direction. The
correlation coefficients between CASH_PAYOUT and control variables are in linewith
expectation and will provide some guidance to the expected signs on the regression
coefficients in the empirical models. The positive correlation coefficient between
CASH_PAYOUT and ROE underpins the traditional relationship between earnings and













N=6,384 CASH_PAYOUT CONTROL_RIGHTS SIZE PRICE_TO_BOOK FREE_CF ROE RPTTIMING
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.1580*      
SIZE 0.0171 0.1983*     
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.0472* 0.0032 Ͳ0.1746*    
FREE_CF 0.1345* 0.0956* Ͳ0.1216* 0.0610*   
ROE 0.0831* 0.1134* 0.2365* 0.3558* 0.1612*  
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0528* Ͳ0.0597* 0.0532* Ͳ0.0631* Ͳ0.0473* Ͳ0.1639* 














75Because the estimates produced by the probitmodel are zͲscores, themarginal effects atmeans are
reportedalongwithEq.1andtomeasuretheeconomicsignificance.
76Althoughsome literatureproposesaquadraticrelationshipbetweenthe largestshareholders’stakeand








ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦݑ݉݉ݕ̴ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ 
൅ ߚସܴܲܫܥܧ̴̴ܱܶܤܱܱܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܨܴܧܧ̴ܥܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܱܧ௜ǡ௧ 
൅ ߚ଻ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧
൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅෍ߚ௝ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ࣟ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͶǤͳሻ
ܥܣܵܪ̴ܲܣܻܱܷ ௜ܶǡ௧
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦݑ݉݉ݕ̴ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ 
൅ ߚସܴܫܥܧ̴̴ܱܶܤܱܱܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܨܴܧܧ̴ܥܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܱܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଼ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ
൅෍ߚ௝ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ࣟ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͶǤʹሻ
Column(4) inTable4.5showsthecoefficientonCONTROL_RIGHTS ispositiveand
signficant at 1% level, supporting a positive contribution from control rights on the
likelihood of cash dividends. Themarginal effect at themeans, dy/dx, indicates a 10%
increase(decrease)inCONTROL_RIGHTSisexpectedtoresultina2.3%increase(decrease)
in the likelihood of a cash dividend announcement. Meanwhile, the coefficient on
Dummy_LowControlisaslosignificantlynegativeat1%level,whichmeansfirmscontrolled
by UCSs which havemore competence in a potential proxy contest are less likely to
distributecashdividends.

77 Both Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.2 are also estimatedwith lagged control rights and lagged control variables as





DUMMY_CASHDIV ExpectedSigns (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue
Intercept  Ͳ0.116** (0.010) Ͳ0.100* (0.071) Ͳ3.661*** (0.000) Ͳ3.248*** (0.000)
CONTROL_RIGHTS + 1.368*** (0.000) 1.337*** (0.000) 0.822*** (0.000) 0.624*** (0.000)
  0.497  0.485  0.285  0.216 
Dummy_LowControl Ͳ   Ͳ0.029 (0.639)   Ͳ0.177*** (0.009)
    Ͳ0.011    Ͳ0.061 
Size +     0.199*** (0.000) 0.203*** (0.000)
      0.069  0.070 
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ     Ͳ0.094*** (0.000) Ͳ0.093*** (0.000)
      Ͳ0.033  Ͳ0.032 
FREE_CF +     0.026 (0.510) 0.028 (0.467)
      0.090  0.010 
ROE +     8.414*** (0.000) 8.405*** (0.000)
      2.914  2.911 
RPTTIMING Ͳ     Ͳ0.208*** (0.000) Ͳ0.208*** (0.001)
      Ͳ0.072  Ͳ0.072 
LEVERAGE Ͳ     Ͳ0.424*** (0.000) Ͳ0.431*** (0.000)
      Ͳ0.147  Ͳ0.149 
SDCR ?     0.273*** (0.000) 0.272*** (0.000)
      0.095  0.094 
YearDummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2  0.021  0.021  0.171  0.172 
ɍ2  165.6  166.3  918.6  929.7 
This table reports the estimation results of probit model Eq.4.1. The error term is adjusted for





impact fromcontrol rightson themagnitudeofacashpayout.Column (4)ofTable4.6










CASH_PAYOUT ExpectedSigns (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue
Intercept  0.019 (0.144) 0.031* (0.059) Ͳ0.193 (0.100) Ͳ0.197* (0.097)
CONTROL_RIGHTS + 0.402*** (0.000) 0.380*** (0.000) 0.267*** (0.000) 0.216*** (0.000)
Dummy_LowControl Ͳ   Ͳ0.023 (0.240)   Ͳ0.050*** (0.007)
Size +     0.023*** (0.000) 0.024*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ     Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.012*** (0.000)
FREE_CF +     0.017 (0.110) 0.017 (0.102)
ROE +     0.846*** (0.000) 0.844*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ     Ͳ0.047*** (0.001) Ͳ0.047*** (0.001)
LEVERAGE Ͳ     Ͳ0.108*** (0.000) Ͳ0.110*** (0.000)
SDCR ?     0.035*** (0.004) 0.035*** (0.004)
YearDummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy  No  No  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2  0.026  0.026  0.096  0.097 
FͲtest  187.4  93.6  37.4  36.0 
This table reports the estimation results of tobit model Eq.4.2. The error term is adjusted for
heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). Refer to Table 4.2 for variable definitions. pͲvalues are reported in
parentheses.*,**and***denotesignificanceat10%,5%and1%levels,respectively.
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firms,80 it provides the minority shareholders with an option of freeͲriding, and the














negotiable shares,82 cashdividendshavebecomean ideal tool forUCSs tomonitor the
managersandobtainaninvestmentreturnwhenmaintainingtheirpositionsascontrolling










havenegative influenceon thepropensity andmagnitudeof cashdividendpayouts. In
contrast,thecoefficientsonSIZEandROEaresignificantlypositive, in linewithprevious
literaturesuchasGul(1999),BlauandFuller(2008),EijeandMegginson(2008)andZhang
(2008).The significantpositive coefficientonSDCR suggests the stockdividends froma
capitalreserveannouncementarelinkedwithahigherlikelihoodandlargermagnitudeof












ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܷܥ̴ܵܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵǡ௧
൅ ߚଶܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶܵ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦݑ݉݉ݕ̴ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚହܴܲܫܥܧ̴̴ܱܶܤܱܱܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܨܴܧܧ̴ܥܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚଽܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ
൅෍ߚ௝ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ࣟ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͶǤ͵ሻ




ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܷܥ̴ܵܦݑ݉݉ݕ௜ǡ௧ ൈ ܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵǡ௧
൅ ߚଶܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶܵ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦݑ݉݉ݕ̴ܮ݋ݓܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚହܴܲܫܥܧ̴̴ܱܶܤܱܱܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܨܴܧܧ̴ܥܨ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܱܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚଽܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଵ଴ܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ
൅෍ߚ௝ ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ࣟ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͶǤͶሻ

83 Both Eq.4.3 and Eq.4.4 are also estimatedwith lagged control rights and lagged control variables as






less likely toannouncecashdividends. It isconfirmedbycolumn (3)whichsuggests the










increase the likelihoodofcashdividendannouncements.Bycontrast, thecoefficienton
DSOELG is negative and significant at the 5% level, as shown in column (4). SOELGͲ












DUMMY_CASHDIV (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ3.438*** (0.000) Ͳ3.437*** (0.000) Ͳ3.239*** (0.000) Ͳ3.214*** (0.000) Ͳ3.404*** (0.000)
DSOECG 0.118 (0.129)        
DSOELG Ͳ0.162*** (0.005)        
DSAMB Ͳ0.110** (0.016)        
DPrivate×CONTROL_RIGHTS   0.186* (0.087)      
DSOECG×CONTROL_RIGHTS     0.613*** (0.000)    
DSOELG×CONTROL_RIGHTS       Ͳ0.285** (0.013)  
DSAMB×CONTROL_RIGHTS         Ͳ0.140 (0.128)
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.687*** (0.000) 0.601*** (0.000) 0.587*** (0.000) 0.683*** (0.000) 0.709*** (0.000)
Dummy_LowControl Ͳ0.186** (0.006) Ͳ0.172** (0.011) Ͳ0.180*** (0.008) Ͳ0.176*** (0.009) Ͳ0.174** (0.011)
SIZE 0.214*** (0.000) 0.212*** (0.000) 0.202*** (0.000) 0.202*** (0.000) 0.210*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.095*** (0.000) Ͳ0.093*** (0.000) Ͳ0.095*** (0.000) Ͳ0.093*** (0.000) Ͳ0.093*** (0.000)
FREE_CF 0.035 (0.371) 0.032 (0.407) 0.029 (0.457) 0.031 (0.429) 0.030 (0.437)
ROE 8.325*** (0.000) 8.330*** (0.000) 8.458*** (0.000) 8.384*** (0.000) 8.371*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.205*** (0.001) Ͳ0.209*** (0.001) Ͳ0.205*** (0.001) Ͳ0.211*** (0.000) Ͳ0.207*** (0.001)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.424*** (0.000) Ͳ0.429*** (0.000) Ͳ0.427*** (0.000) Ͳ0.427*** (0.000) Ͳ0.430*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.251*** (0.000) 0.254*** (0.000) 0.279*** (0.000) 0.264*** (0.000) 0.264*** (0.000)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2 0.174  0.173  0.174  0.173  0.173 










than firms with other types of UCSs. As aforementioned, SAMB UCSs are effectively
governmentagencieswithcommitmentbeyondeconomicprofits.ThemanagersofSAMBͲ
controlled firms are generally government officials, which minimizes the agency cost
betweenlargeshareholdersandmanagers.ThereisnoneedforSAMBUCSstomitigatethe
agencycost. Instead,SAMBUCSs intend tomake themanagershoard thecashbalance.
BothfactorslowersthemagnitudeofcashpayoutbySAMBͲcontrolledfirms.
Bycontrast,column (2)suggests firmswithPrivateUCSspaymorecashdividends,
different from Table 4.7 which shows little evidence that they have an outstanding
likelihoodofacashdividend.Theresultcanbe,however,attributedtotheseparationof
ownership andmanagement in these firms, as Private UCSs aremore accustomed to
employingprofessionalsasthemanagersofcontrolledentities.AsperTable4.3,Private









CASH_PAYOUT (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue
Intercept 0.340*** (0.000) Ͳ0.265** (0.028) Ͳ0.188 (0.109) Ͳ0.194* (0.098) Ͳ0.259** (0.031)
DSOECG 0.000 (0.986)        
DSOELG Ͳ0.029* (0.064)        
DSAMB Ͳ0.033*** (0.004)        
DPrivate×CONTROL_RIGHTS   0.062** (0.019)      
DSOECG×CONTROL_RIGHTS     0.061 (0.121)    
DSOELG×CONTROL_RIGHTS       Ͳ0.018 (0.571)  
DSAMB×CONTROL_RIGHTS         Ͳ0.054** (0.015)
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.232*** (0.000) 0.209*** (0.000) 0.211*** (0.000) 0.219*** (0.000) 0.250*** (0.000)
Dummy_LowControl Ͳ0.052*** (0.006) Ͳ0.048*** (0.010) Ͳ0.051*** (0.007) Ͳ0.050*** (0.007) Ͳ0.049*** (0.009)
SIZE 0.028*** (0.000) 0.027*** (0.000) 0.024*** (0.000) 0.024*** (0.000) 0.027*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.012*** (0.000)
FREE_CF 0.019* (0.068) 0.019* (0.078) 0.018* (0.096) 0.017* (0.099) 0.018* (0.083)
ROE 0.823*** (0.000) 0.825*** (0.000) 0.848*** (0.000) 0.842*** (0.000) 0.837*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.047*** (0.001) Ͳ0.047*** (0.001) Ͳ0.047*** (0.001) Ͳ0.047*** (0.001) Ͳ0.047*** (0.001)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.108*** (0.000) Ͳ0.109*** (0.000) Ͳ0.109*** (0.000) Ͳ0.109*** (0.000) Ͳ0.109*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.028** (0.020) 0.029** (0.020) 0.035*** (0.003) 0.034*** (0.004) 0.031*** (0.009)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2 0.099  0.098  0.098  0.097  0.098 













This section describes further analysis which was undertaken to evaluate the
robustnessofthereportedresults.First,thekeyindependentvariable,CONTROL_RIGHTS,
is replaced by CONTROL_CASH_GAP, which indicates the difference between



















 N CONTROL_RIGHTS CASH_RIGHTS CONTROL_CASH_GAP tͲstat
Wholesample 2,563 0.3790 0.2360 0.1430* 94.93
  (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0015)
Private 1,466 0.3561 0.2167 0.1394* 66.76
  (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0020)
SOECG 160 0.3730 0.2354 0.1376* 23.29
  (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0059)
SOELG 230 0.3839 0.2494 0.1345* 28.09
  (0.0100) (0.0090) (0.0021)
SAMB 707 0.4267 0.2724 0.1543* 60.00








Consequently, they are more likely to be exposed to the traditional agencyͲprincipal
problemasthemultipleͲlevelshareholdingstructuremaywellexacerbatethechangeinthe
managers’ selfͲdealingbehaviours.On theotherhand, although SAMBͲcontrolled firms
exhibitthelargestmeanCONTROL_CASH_GAP,themajorityoffirmscontrolledbystateͲ
owned UCSs, approximately 75 per cent, report a zero CONTROL_CASH_GAP, which
suggestsstateͲownedUCSsarerelativelyconservativeincorporatecontrolledmarkets.88
Table4.10andTable4.11repeattheregressionsinSections4.4.1and4.4.2withthe
key independent variable set as CONTROL_CASH_GAP. Table 4.9 indicates that






CONTROL_CASH_GAPhas strongpower toexplain thevariation inbothpropensityand
magnitudeofcashdividendannouncements.Further,Table4.11affirmstheresultsofTable









 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ4.553*** (0.000) Ͳ4.458*** (0.000) Ͳ0.508** (0.012) Ͳ0.480** (0.017)
CONTROL_CASH_GAP 1.304*** (0.000) 1.012*** (0.008) 0.517*** (0.000) 0.413*** (0.000)
Dummy_LowControl   Ͳ0.250*** (0.004)   Ͳ0.095*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.258*** (0.000) 0.258*** (0.000) 0.038*** (0.000) 0.038*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.081*** (0.000) Ͳ0.084*** (0.000) Ͳ0.007 (0.115) Ͳ0.008* (0.062)
FREE_CF 0.110* (0.060) 0.110* (0.058) 0.051*** (0.003) 0.051*** (0.003)
ROE 7.436*** (0.000) 7.420*** (0.000) 0.667*** (0.000) 0.674*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.179* (0.057) Ͳ0.183* (0.051) Ͳ0.047** (0.039) Ͳ0.048** (0.035)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.352*** (0.000) Ͳ0.354*** (0.000) Ͳ0.088*** (0.000) Ͳ0.089*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.289*** (0.000) 0.286*** (0.000) 0.045** (0.017) 0.044** (0.020)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 2,563  2,563  2,563  2,563 
PseudoR2 0.153  0.169  0.089  0.094 
X2 337.3  344.9     
FͲtest     13.2  13.9 
This table reports the estimation results of probit model Eq.4.1 and tobit model Eq.4.2 with
CONTROL_CASH_GAPasthekeyindependentvariable,inPanelAandPanelB,respectively.Theerrorterms








PanelALikelihoodofcashdividend        
DUMMY_CASHDIV (1)DPrivate pͲvalue (2)DSOECG pͲvalue (3)DSOELG pͲvalue (4)DSAMB pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ4.729*** (0.000) Ͳ4.506*** (0.000) Ͳ4.550*** (0.000) Ͳ4.937*** (0.000)
UCS_Dummy
×CONTROL_CASH_GAP 0.416 (0.259) 1.801
** (0.035) Ͳ0.137 (0.836) Ͳ0.905** (0.022)
CONTROL_CASH_GAP 1.048** (0.014) 1.244*** (0.001) 1.311*** (0.000) 1.563*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.267*** (0.000) 0.255*** (0.000) 0.258*** (0.000) 0.275*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.081*** (0.000) Ͳ0.083*** (0.000) Ͳ0.081*** (0.000) Ͳ0.082*** (0.000)
FREE_CF 0.114** (0.050) 0.105* (0.070) 0.110* (0.099) 0.117** (0.044)
ROE 7.405*** (0.000) 7.468*** (0.000) 7.438*** (0.000) 7.371*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.178* (0.058) Ͳ0.178* (0.058) Ͳ0.180* (0.056) Ͳ0.170* (0.073)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.351*** (0.000) Ͳ0.355*** (0.000) Ͳ0.351*** (0.000) Ͳ0.355*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.275*** (0.001) 0.298*** (0.000) 0.288*** (0.000) 0.268*** (0.001)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2 0.153  0.154  0.153  0.154 
ɍ2 337.4  338.9  339.5  334.8 
PanelBMagnitudeofcashdividend        
CASH_PAYOUT (1)DPrivate pͲvalue (2)DSOECG pͲvalue (3)DSOELG pͲvalue (4)DSAMB pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.578*** (0.005) Ͳ0.506** (0.012) Ͳ0.507** (0.012) Ͳ0.583*** (0.004)
UCS_Dummy
×CONTROL_CASH_GAP 0.160
* (0.086) 0.076 (0.593) Ͳ0.087 (0.572) Ͳ0.176* (0.079)
CONTROL_CASH_GAP 0.420*** (0.000) 0.513*** (0.000) 0.522*** (0.000) 0.566*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.042*** (0.000) 0.038*** (0.000) 0.038*** (0.000) 0.042*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.007 (0.117) Ͳ0.007 (0.113) Ͳ0.007 (0.119) Ͳ0.007 (0.105)
FREE_CF 0.053*** (0.002) 0.051*** (0.003) 0.052*** (0.003) 0.053*** (0.002)
ROE 0.659*** (0.000) 0.667*** (0.000) 0.668*** (0.000) 0.656*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.046** (0.042) Ͳ0.047** (0.039) Ͳ0.048** (0.036) Ͳ0.045* (0.051)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.088*** (0.000) Ͳ0.088*** (0.000) Ͳ0.088*** (0.000) Ͳ0.089*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.039** (0.039) 0.045** (0.017) 0.044** (0.019) 0.040** (0.034)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PseudoR2 0.090  0.089  0.089  0.090 
FͲtest 12.6  12.7  12.5  12.6 





Second, regression models Eq.4.1 and Eq.4.2 are estimated with various
methodologies,includingordinaryleastsquares(OLS),FamaͲMacbethtwoͲstageprocedure


































of the cash dividend policy. Contrary to past studies about nonͲstateͲowned firms’


















Thischapter investigates stockabnormal returns followingsimultaneousdividends
andearningsannouncements,89andtheavailabilityofinformationonultimatecontrolling
shareholders, in theChineseequitymarket.Theoretically, thevaluationofa firm isnot
affectedbythedividendpolicyinafrictionlesscapitalmarket,becausefuturecapitalgain
from thegrowth ratewillbeoffsetbyacurrentdividend (MillerandModigliani,1961).
However,withmarketinefficiencies,suchastransactioncostsandincometax,unexpected
changes incashdividendsmaybetakenasasignalreflectingthemanagers’opinionson
future operating performance, and may affect the market capitalization due to the
existenceof incometaxandasymmetric informationbetweentheexternalshareholders
andthemanagers(Lintner,1956,Pettit,1972,Charest,1978a,Bhattacharya,1979,Divecha
andMorse, 1983,Miller and Rock, 1985, Ghosh andWoolridge, 1988). A number of











Intuitively, unless the operating performance changes significantly,managers prefer to
adopta stickydividendpolicyandmaintain the flexibilityofapayoutpolicywithother
distribution methods, such as share repurchase, to avoid the impact on investors’
expectations and the firm’smarket valuation. Further, comparedwith the synchronous
earnings announcement, the dividend announcement, especially a change in the cash
dividend, hasmore influence on the stock abnormal return (Healy and Palepu, 1988,
Woolridge,1982,Aharonyetal.,1988,Lee,1995,DockingandKoch,2005,Skinner,2008).90
Beingoneofthelargesttransitionaleconomies,Chinahasbeeninthespotlightand
arousedresearchers’ interest in recentyears.Asa typicalgovernmentͲsponsoredequity
market, the wealth effect caused by partial share issuance privatization (SIP) and
significantly positive IPO underpricing (Zhou and Zhou, 2010) results in negotiable
shareholders’preference forcapitalgain. Incontrast,cashdividendyieldsare relatively
trivialandnegligible.91Previousstudiesoninvestors’reactionstodividendannouncements
intheChinesemarketreportmixedresults.92Chenetal.(2009a)documentthatthestock
abnormal return is positively associatedwith both an increase and a decrease in cash
dividends,whichimpliesinvestorswelcomecashdividendsandareindifferenttoachange
individend.93Otherstudies,however,concludethatacashdividendannouncementmakes

























typesof stockdividends. In fact, thereare two kindsof stockdividends in theChinese











95According to the soͲcalled ‘retainedearningshypothesis’basedon theaccountingprinciples in theUS,
becauseasmallstockdividend,nomorethan25%,requiresthefirmtodeducttheretainedearningsaccount





management todistribute theexcessive cashbalanceand restrictpotential selfͲdealing
behaviours (Jensen,1986,MillerandRock,1985).Thisargument is supportedby some
empiricalevidence(LangandLitzenberger,1989,Grahametal.,2006,Chengetal.,2007,








especially when the large shareholders are less able to liquidate their shareholdings
becauseofregulatoryissues(Howetal.,2008).Inthemeantime,someempiricalstudiesin
Chinafocusontherelationshipbetweenthedividendpayoutpracticeandtheownership
























the literature that findsChinesenegotiable shareholdersprefer stockdividends to cash
dividends,butareinconsistentwiththeliteraturethatearningsannouncementshavemore




consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2009c), that types of ultimate controlling
shareholders(UCSs)influencetheoperatingperformanceofChineselistedfirms,investors
reactdiscriminatorilytocashdividendshocksfromfirmswithdifferenttypesofUCSs,but










which report mixed results. Chen et al.(2002) document that stock dividend
announcements work as a catalyst to earnings announcement, in that, they enhance


















SDCR and SDRE are different from each other in many aspects, such as accounting
treatmentsandtaxation issues.AspertheChineseCorporationLaw,capitalreservescan
only be transferred to paidͲin capital accounts, while retained earnings have more
functions,suchasmakinguplossescarriedͲforward,increasingpaidͲincapitalandpaying
cashdividends.Ingeneral,SDCRisregardedasanaccountingpracticetosubstantiatethe





because theirwealthwillbe reducedby the amountof the corresponding income tax.
Moreover,stockdividendsfromretainedearningsmaysuggestinferiorearningsqualityand

















changes incashdividends,and the impact ismagnifiedby themarketmomentum (Lee,
1995,Woolridge,1982,GhoshandWoolridge,1988,GhoshandWoolridge,1991,Docking
and Koch, 2005, Yeh et al., 2011). But the existing literature on the cash dividend
announcementeffect intheChinesemarket isdifferentfromthegeneralconsensus.For
example,Chenetal.(2002)concludefewconnectionsexistbetweencashdividendsand





(2011)document that cashdividendplaysa supplementary role in thedividendpayout
policyofChineselistedfirms.99ButYietal.(2007)arguethatthemeasurementofreturn























day, except in some special cases. Some empirical research suggests the unexpected
earningshaveapositiveinfluenceonthestockabnormalreturn(Chenetal.,2002,Cheng
et al., 2009). This chapter conjectures, however, that the earnings shockmakes little
contribution to stock abnormal return because of the poor corporate governance
environmentandpopularearningsmanagementpracticesintheChinesemarket(Shenand
Chih,2007,BhaumikandGregoriou,2010,Hawetal.,2005,Chenetal.,2011).













protectionforminority investors inChina (Mitton,2004,Wangetal.,2008).Since2003,





Besides thecontrol rights, the typesofUCSsarealso introducedbecauseChinese
minorityshareholdersoftendeemthestrengthofUCSstobeanimportantfactorforthe
prosperityoftheunderlyinglistedcompany.AstrongUCSmayimplypotentialsupportin
case of financial distress,whereas aweakUCSmay exacerbate the expropriation. This
chapter adopts the categorization defined by Chen et al. (2009c) Ͳ StateͲowned Asset
Management Bureau (SAMB), State Owned Enterprises (SOE) affiliated with central
government(SOECG),SOEsaffiliatedwithlocalgovernment(SOELG),andPrivateinvestors
(Private).TheseUCSshavedifferentbackgrounds,naturesandfinancialcapacity.102Chen




101 The information includes their background, affiliation with different levels of government, direct
shareholdings(cashrights)and,directandindirectshareholdings(controlrights).
102FordetailsofthedifferencesamongvarioustypesofUCSs,refertoChapter4.





force themanagers topayoutmorecashtomitigatetheagencycostof freecash flow,
whichwillbetakenasapositivesignalbyminorityshareholders.Meanwhile,SAMBUCSs
areeffectivelygovernmentagenciesanddeemedtobetheleastefficientofthosetypesof

























within the window between 30Ͳdays before and 10Ͳdays after the earnings/dividend
announcement.After applying theabove filtering criteria, there are9,405observations
from1,203firmsacrosstheobservationwindowbetween1999and2010,ofwhich4,806
observations,about51per cent,make cashͲonlydividendannouncements.Besides the



















Total 4,806 244 685 336 50 257 47 2,980















window,manysharesheldby largeshareholdersareactually lockedͲup,which inflatethemarketvalueof
firmswithlargeblockoflockedͲupnegotiableshare.HMLandSMBfactorsinFFͲ3Ͳfactormodelreliesonthe




ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ܽ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ௜ǡ௧ݎ௠ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͷǤͳሻ
Dailyabnormalreturnisdefinedasfollows:
ܣܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ݎ௜ǡ௧ െ ሺܽపǡ௧ෞ ൅ ߚపǡ௧෢ ݎ௠ሻሺܧݍǤ ͷǤʹሻ
FourCARwindowsaregenerated,includingonepreͲeventwindow[Ͳ10,Ͳ2],andthree
eventwindows,[Ͳ1,+1],[Ͳ3,+3],and[Ͳ10,+10],definedasshort,mediumandlongevent




























ܧത൫ܧܲ ௜ܵǡ௧൯ ൌ ܧܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ିଵ ൈ ൫ͳ ൅ ܫܨܧ௝ǡ௧൯ሺܧݍǤ ͷǤ͵ሻ    
ܧത൫ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧൯ ൌ ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ିଵ ൈ ൫ͳ ൅ ܫܨܦ௝ǡ௧൯ሺܧݍǤ ͷǤͶሻ    









The expectations models specified above are used to estimate the unexpected
earnings, ‘earnings shock’, UNEXPECTED_EPSi,t, and the unexpected cash dividend,




















ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ െ ܧത൫ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧൯













financialyearendand financialreportannouncementday,RPTTIMING, is introduced to
control the timingof financial statements.Firm sizemayalsoexertan influenceon the





to the announcement date. The proxy of financial risk, LEVERAGE, is defined as total
interestͲbearingliabilitiesscaledbytotalequity.Idiosyncraticriskandfinancialleverageare































stock dividend have better CARs in all four windows. The comparison ofmean CARs
betweenPanelBandPanelCindicatessomedeteriorationinrecentperiods.






 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
PanelA:CashͲpayersample(1999Ͳ2010,N=6,071)
CAR_PRE 0.0070 0.0644 Ͳ0.0650 Ͳ0.0310 0.0014 0.0391 0.0885
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0052 0.0488 Ͳ0.0634 Ͳ0.0325 Ͳ0.0069 0.0195 0.0541
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0025 0.0656 Ͳ0.0771 Ͳ0.0400 Ͳ0.0066 0.0310 0.0766
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0011 0.1035 Ͳ0.1227 Ͳ0.0614 Ͳ0.0064 0.0532 0.1292
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0010 0.0092 Ͳ0.0083 Ͳ0.0023 0.0005 0.0047 0.0109
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.1796 1.7040 Ͳ0.6938 Ͳ0.4273 Ͳ0.0676 0.4570 1.2971
IDIO_RISK 0.0210 0.0074 0.0117 0.0152 0.0205 0.0263 0.0311
SIZE 21.7129 1.1163 20.4264 20.9047 21.5493 22.3433 23.1978
LEVERAGE 0.5296 0.4849 0.4043 2.2984 0.0000 1.36 4.87
PanelB:CashͲonlyͲpayersample(1999–2010,N=4,806)
CAR_PRE 0.0034 0.0608 Ͳ0.0643 Ͳ0.0322 Ͳ0.0012 0.0330 0.0793
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0095 0.0457 Ͳ0.0655 Ͳ0.0341 Ͳ0.0097 0.0147 0.0455
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0083 0.0614 Ͳ0.0790 Ͳ0.0426 Ͳ0.0106 0.0238 0.0635
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0074 0.0995 Ͳ0.1238 Ͳ0.0636 Ͳ0.0109 0.0447 0.1146
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0014 0.0095 Ͳ0.0081 Ͳ0.0020 0.0007 0.0053 0.0120
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.1384 1.8569 Ͳ0.7158 Ͳ0.4392 Ͳ0.0674 0.4571 1.2965
IDIO_RISK 0.0206 0.0074 0.0114 0.0148 0.0200 0.0258 0.0310
SIZE 21.7362 1.1279 20.4641 20.9277 21.5653 22.3572 23.2234
LEVERAGE 0.5302 0.4833 0.0298 0.1621 0.4055 0.7635 1.1848
PanelC:CashͲonlyͲpayerͲsamplewithcontrolrights(2003–2010,N=3,436)
CAR_PRE 0.0041 0.0671 Ͳ0.0726 Ͳ0.0374 0.0000 0.0388 0.0864
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0117 0.0496 Ͳ0.0726 Ͳ0.0395 Ͳ0.0116 0.0152 0.0480
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0103 0.0669 Ͳ0.0887 Ͳ0.0496 Ͳ0.0135 0.0267 0.0699
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0094 0.1085 Ͳ0.1393 Ͳ0.0744 Ͳ0.0132 0.0492 0.1272
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0010 0.0101 Ͳ0.0088 Ͳ0.0021 0.0004 0.0049 0.0120
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ0.0295 1.9366 Ͳ0.7392 Ͳ0.4967 Ͳ0.1479 0.3950 1.2079
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4199 0.1559 0.2121 0.2975 0.4184 0.5359 0.6310
IDIO_RISK 0.0229 0.0068 0.0141 0.0177 0.0226 0.0277 0.0320
SIZE 21.9204 1.1796 20.5829 21.0794 21.7333 22.5929 23.5000
LEVERAGE 0.5760 0.5132 0.0316 0.1810 0.4487 0.8285 1.2719
PanelD:CashͲonlyͲpayerͲsamplewithPrivateUCSs(N=922)
CAR_PRE 0.0060 0.0686 Ͳ0.0692 Ͳ0.0383 Ͳ0.0001 0.0399 0.0938
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0133 0.0511 Ͳ0.0774 Ͳ0.0448 Ͳ0.013 0.0166 0.0486
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0103 0.0686 Ͳ0.0897 Ͳ0.0522 Ͳ0.0138 0.032 0.077
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0107 0.1086 Ͳ0.1393 Ͳ0.0739 Ͳ0.0168 0.05 0.126
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0002 0.0101 Ͳ0.0097 Ͳ0.0029 0.0000 0.004 0.011
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0048 1.474 Ͳ0.7323 Ͳ0.5123 Ͳ0.2122 0.2874 1.0134
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.346 0.1389 0.1812 0.2452 0.3203 0.4255 0.555
IDIO_RISK 0.0237 0.0063 0.0157 0.0192 0.0234 0.0283 0.0317
SIZE 21.4445 0.9000 20.3555 20.8053 21.3298 22.0374 22.6544
LEVERAGE 0.5519 0.4721 0.0333 0.1877 0.4552 0.8031 1.1819
PanelE:CashͲonlyͲpayerͲsamplewithSOECGUCSs(N=280)
CAR_PRE 0.0025 0.0679 Ͳ0.0636 Ͳ0.0379 Ͳ0.0013 0.0328 0.0771
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0088 0.0489 Ͳ0.0656 Ͳ0.0375 Ͳ0.0094 0.018 0.0581
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0113 0.0662 Ͳ0.0932 Ͳ0.0470 Ͳ0.0108 0.0281 0.0633
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0133 0.114 Ͳ0.1388 Ͳ0.0710 Ͳ0.0138 0.0404 0.1347
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0008 0.0099 Ͳ0.0090 Ͳ0.0020 0.0002 0.004 0.0106
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ0.0658 2.3292 Ͳ0.7768 Ͳ0.5553 Ͳ0.1889 0.4773 1.4331
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.433 0.1823 0.1832 0.2632 0.4494 0.5717 0.6993
IDIO_RISK 0.0226 0.0071 0.0141 0.0174 0.0216 0.0277 0.0325
SIZE 21.9618 1.3056 20.5906 21.0957 21.7351 22.558 23.7786




 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
PanelF:CashͲonlyͲpayerͲsamplewithSOELGUCSs(N=550)
CAR_PRE 0.0088 0.063 Ͳ0.0652 Ͳ0.0316 0.0029 0.0441 0.0886
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0124 0.0476 Ͳ0.0684 Ͳ0.0372 Ͳ0.0128 0.0125 0.0449
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0095 0.0648 Ͳ0.0789 Ͳ0.0455 Ͳ0.0123 0.0214 0.0611
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0029 0.0985 Ͳ0.1262 Ͳ0.0666 Ͳ0.0033 0.0533 0.1134
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0015 0.0109 Ͳ0.0095 Ͳ0.0024 0.0002 0.0062 0.0142
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ0.209 2.5397 Ͳ0.8096 Ͳ0.5275 Ͳ0.1397 0.4087 1.2075
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4386 0.1492 0.25 0.3207 0.4323 0.554 0.6332
IDIO_RISK 0.0209 0.0068 0.0127 0.0155 0.02 0.025 0.031
SIZE 21.668 0.9618 20.5693 20.9558 21.53 22.2959 22.9539
LEVERAGE 0.5472 0.4829 0.0333 0.1568 0.4264 0.8033 1.2171
PanelG:CashͲonlyͲpayerͲsamplewithSAMBUCSs(N=1,684)
CAR_PRE 0.0017 0.0674 Ͳ0.0776 Ͳ0.0384 Ͳ0.0014 0.0376 0.0836
CAR_SHORT Ͳ0.0111 0.0495 Ͳ0.0703 Ͳ0.0386 Ͳ0.0111 0.0146 0.0476
CAR_MEDIUM Ͳ0.0104 0.0667 Ͳ0.0889 Ͳ0.0504 Ͳ0.0139 0.0256 0.0693
CAR_LONG Ͳ0.0102 0.1106 Ͳ0.1443 Ͳ0.0776 Ͳ0.0147 0.0478 0.1326
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0012 0.0099 Ͳ0.0083 Ͳ0.0018 0.0007 0.0051 0.0119
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0164 1.857 Ͳ0.7215 Ͳ0.4827 Ͳ0.1076 0.4632 1.3296
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.4521 0.1487 0.2487 0.3428 0.4649 0.5587 0.6441
IDIO_RISK 0.0233 0.007 0.0142 0.0179 0.023 0.0278 0.0325
SIZE 22.2565 1.2467 20.8303 21.3617 22.0634 23.0022 23.9618
LEVERAGE 0.6061 0.547 0.0334 0.1875 0.4584 0.8708 1.3873
Thistablecontainsdescriptivestatisticsforvariablesofinterestthatareusedinthefollowinganalysis.Panel
ApresentsthedescriptivestatisticsofcashͲpayersample;PanelBpresentsthedescriptivestatisticsofcashͲ









UCSs information is subdividedbasedon the typesofUCSs, the summary statistics are
reported inPanelD toPanelGofTable5.3.SOECGͲcontrolled firms report thehighest
average CAR_SHORT and SOELG controlled firms lead in CAR_LONG.Meanwhile, four





PanelA      
N=6,071 UNEXPECTED_DPS UNEXPECTED_EPS IDIO_RISK Size LEVERAGE 
CAR_PRE 0.0116 0.0070 Ͳ0.0489* Ͳ0.0064 0.001 
CAR_SHORT 0.0162 0.0132 Ͳ0.0814* 0.0286 0.0044 
CAR_MEDIUM 0.0096 Ͳ0.0155 Ͳ0.0897* 0.0076 Ͳ0.0109 
CAR_LONG 0.0115 Ͳ0.0223 Ͳ0.1197* 0.0001 Ͳ0.0025 
UNEXPECTED_DPS  0.1659* Ͳ0.0136 Ͳ0.0278 Ͳ0.0229 
UNEXPECTED_EPS   Ͳ0.0457* Ͳ0.0211 0.0294 
IDIO_RISK    0.0408* 0.1238* 
Size     0.3296* 
PanelB      
N=4,806 UNEXPECTED_DPS UNEXPECTED_EPS IDIO_RISK Size LEVERAGE 
CAR_PRE 0.0152 0.0073 Ͳ0.0591* Ͳ0.0015 Ͳ0.0124 
CAR_SHORT 0.0406* 0.0041 Ͳ0.1048* 0.0562* 0.0063 
CAR_MEDIUM 0.0268 Ͳ0.0202 Ͳ0.1127* 0.028 Ͳ0.0212 
CAR_LONG 0.02000 Ͳ0.0278 Ͳ0.1302* 0.0113 Ͳ0.0044 
UNEXPECTED_DPS  0.1574* Ͳ0.0245 Ͳ0.0398* Ͳ0.0341 
UNEXPECTED_EPS   Ͳ0.0364 Ͳ0.0272 0.0205 
IDIO_RISK    0.0490* 0.1336* 
Size     0.3136* 
PanelC      
N=4,425 UNEXPECTED_DPS UNEXPECTED_EPS IDIO_RISK Size LEVERAGE CONTROL_RIGHTS
CAR_PRE 0.0141 Ͳ0.004 Ͳ0.0923* Ͳ0.0099 Ͳ0.0232 Ͳ0.0003
CAR_SHORT 0.0117 Ͳ0.012 Ͳ0.0954* 0.0717* 0.0162 0.0334*
CAR_MEDIUM 0.0077 Ͳ0.0417 Ͳ0.1295* 0.0438 Ͳ0.0174 0.0170
CAR_LONG 0.0086 Ͳ0.0475* Ͳ0.1586* 0.0198 Ͳ0.0080 0.0173
UNEXPECTED_DPS  0.1411* Ͳ0.0049 Ͳ0.0303 Ͳ0.0287 Ͳ0.0142
UNEXPECTED_EPS   0.0126 0.0074 0.0399 Ͳ0.0101
IDIO_RISK    Ͳ0.0992* 0.0583* Ͳ0.1184*
Size     0.2992* 0.2378*
LEVERAGE      Ͳ0.0702*
This table contains Pearson’s correlation coefficientsmatrix for selected variables that are used in the
followinganalysis.PanelApresents thedescriptive statisticsof cashͲpayer sample; PanelBpresents the
descriptive statistics of cashͲonlyͲpayer sample; Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of cashͲpayer
sample with control rights since 2003. Refer to Table 5.2 for variable definitions. * denotes statistical
significanceat1%level.

ThePearson’s correlation coefficientsmatrix is reported inTable5.4. In the cashͲ
payersample,unexpecteddividendshavenosignificantcorrelationwith thecumulative
abnormalreturnofallpreͲeventandeventwindows.But inthecashͲonlyͲpayersample,
unexpected dividend reports a significant positive correlation with CAR_SHORT and a
marginallypositivecorrelationwithCAR_MEDIUM.Butwhenobservationwindowisfrom
2003 to2010,as shown inPanelC,dividend shockhas littlecorrelationwithCARs,but
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earnings shockhasa significantnegativecorrelation,althoughonlymarginally,with the
CAR_MEDIUM. Inconsistent with expectation, the correlation coefficients between
unexpectedearningsandCARsareeitherinsignificantorsignificantlynegative.
The correlation coefficients between CARs and IDIO_RISK are all negative and
significantat1%level,whichindicatesthathighervolatilityinthesharepriceisassociated
withlowerCARs.SIZEhaslittleassociationwithabnormalreturns,exceptforCAR_SHORT
in cashͲonlypayer and cashͲpayerwithCONTROL_RIGHTS samples.The announcement




Table 5.5 reports themean CARs by grouping observations based on the sign of
UNEXPECTED_EPS and UNEXPECTED_DPS, and the presence of a simultaneous stock
dividend.Obviously,thestockdividend(eitherorbothofSDCRandSDRE)payersreport
superior CARs across all observationwindows, nomatterwhether the coefficients on
UNEXPECTED_EPS andUNEXPECTED_DPS are positive or negative, consistentwith the







 N CAR_PRE CAR_SHORT CAR_MEDIUM CAR_LONG
PositiveUNEXPECTED_EPS 4,061    
Cashpayer     
WithoutStockdividend     
PositiveUNEXPECTED_DPS 1,488 0.0020 Ͳ0.0069 Ͳ0.0075 Ͳ0.0103
  (1.25) (Ͳ5.45)*** (Ͳ4.43)*** (Ͳ3.86)***
NegativeUNEXPECTED_DPS 703 Ͳ0.0007 Ͳ0.0083 Ͳ0.0090 Ͳ0.0136
  (Ͳ0.32) (Ͳ5.02)*** (Ͳ4.04)*** (Ͳ4.18)***
Withstockdividend     
PositiveUNEXPECTED_DPS 311 0.0244 0.0143 0.0189 0.0210
  (5.45)*** (4.21)*** (4.43)*** (3.20)***
NegativeUNEXPECTED_DPS 249 0.0184 0.0132 0.0233 0.0221
  (4.11)*** (3.49)*** (5.01)*** (3.21)***
CashnonͲpayer     
Withoutstockdividend 1,150 0.0035 Ͳ0.0073 Ͳ0.0065 Ͳ0.0036
  (1.62) (Ͳ4.80)*** (Ͳ2.95)*** (Ͳ1.04)
Withstockdividend 160 0.0254 0.0193 0.0219 0.0232
  (3.74)*** (3.43)*** (3.21)*** (2.26)**
Positivestockdividend 720 0.0226 0.0150 0.0211 0.0219
  (7.78)*** (6.46)*** (7.26)*** (5.04)***
Zerostockdividend 3,341 0.0020 Ͳ0.0073 Ͳ0.0075 Ͳ0.0087
  (1.74)* (Ͳ8.68)*** (Ͳ6.40)*** (Ͳ4.78)***
NegativeUNEXPECTED_EPS 5,344    
Cashpayer     
WithoutStockdividend     
PositiveUNEXPECTED_DPS 1,201 0.0069 Ͳ0.0095 Ͳ0.0062 Ͳ0.0011
  (3.41)*** (Ͳ6.31)*** (Ͳ2.95)*** (Ͳ0.34)
NegativeUNEXPECTED_DPS 1,414 0.0041 Ͳ0.0121 Ͳ0.0097 Ͳ0.0049
  (2.32)** (Ͳ9.22)*** (Ͳ5.48)*** (Ͳ1.73)*
Withstockdividend     
PositiveUNEXPECTED_DPS 284 0.0243 0.0112 0.0249 0.0295
  (4.73)*** (3.29)*** (5.03)*** (3.84)***
NegativeUNEXPECTED_DPS 421 0.0182 0.0090 0.0157 0.0229
  (4.85)*** (3.04)*** (3.78)*** (3.72)***
CashnonͲpayer     
Withoutstockdividend 1,830 0.0026 Ͳ0.0071 Ͳ0.0056 0.0040
  (1.21) (Ͳ5.47)*** (Ͳ3.20)*** (1.29)
Withstockdividend 194 0.0205 0.0107 0.0198 0.0337
  (3.55)*** (2.01)** (2.79)*** (3.65)***
Positivestockdividend 899 0.0206 0.0101 0.0195 0.0273
  (7.65)*** (4.80)*** (6.66)*** (6.41)***
Zerostockdividend 4,445 0.0042 Ͳ0.0093 Ͳ0.0071 Ͳ0.0002
  (3.58)*** (Ͳ11.81)*** (Ͳ6.55)*** (Ͳ0.14)
This table reports average CARs of different combinations based on earnings shock, dividend shock and
simultaneousstockdividend.RefertoTable5.2forvariabledefinitions.

The number of cashͲonly payers with both positive UNEXPECTED_DPS and
UNEXPECTED_EPS (1,488) is twice those with positive UNEXPECTED_EPS but negative
UNEXPECTED_DPS (703), while there are more cashͲonly payers with both negative






seems tobeconsistentlynegative,nomatterwhether it ispositiveornegative,whilea
positiveUNEXPECTED_DPSslightlyalleviatestheimpactfromtheUNEXPECTED_EPS.




return (CAAR) fromday Ͳ10 today+10,groupedby the signsofUNEXPECTED_DPSand
UNEXPECTED_EPS. Similar to Table 5.5, when the signs on UNEXPECTED_EPS
(UNEXPECTED_DPS) are identical, CAAR of groups with positive (negative)
UNEXPECTED_DPS (UNEXPECTED_EPS) is better than that with negative (positive)
UNEXPECTED_DPS (UNEXPECTED_EPS). The group with positive (negative)
UNEXPECTED_DPSandnegative(positive)UNEXPECTED_EPSreportthebest(worst)CAAR
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൅ ߚସܵܦܴܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܫܦܫ̴ܱܴܫܵܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଼ܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ ൅ ࣟ௜ǡ௧ሺǤ ͷǤ͹ሻ
Consistent with Table 5.5 and findings in past studies that Chinese negotiable





and 1.00%, respectively. These outcomes support Hypothesis 5.1 that investors react
positivelytostockdividendannouncementsandSDCRismorewelcome.
Table5Ͳ6Stockdividendannouncementandstockabnormalreturns
 Expectedsigns CAR_PRE pͲvalue CAR_SHORT pͲvalue CAR_MEDIUM pͲvalue CAR_LONG pͲvalue
Intercept  0.1414*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0493*** (0.003) 0.0008 (0.970) 0.0937*** (0.007)
UNEXPECTED_DPS + 0.1535* (0.072) 0.1438** (0.031) 0.1900** (0.032) 0.2939** (0.026)
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ 0.0011** (0.040) Ͳ0.0001 (0.856) Ͳ0.0006 (0.280) Ͳ0.0009 (0.316)
SDCR + 0.0210*** (0.000) 0.0210*** (0.000) 0.0304*** (0.000) 0.0384*** (0.000)
SDRE + 0.0047 (0.147) 0.0095*** (0.000) 0.0099*** (0.002) 0.0098** (0.046)
RPTTIMING Ͳ Ͳ0.0216*** (0.000) 0.0014 (0.518) Ͳ0.0015 (0.574) Ͳ0.0120*** (0.004)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ Ͳ1.4057*** (0.000) Ͳ0.5276*** (0.000) Ͳ1.1459*** (0.000) Ͳ2.4693*** (0.000)
Size + Ͳ0.0010 (0.211) 0.0023*** (0.000) 0.0013 (0.127) 0.0001 (0.994)
LEVERAGE Ͳ 0.0011 (0.547) 0.0002 (0.877) Ͳ0.006 (0.726) 0.0022 (0.437)
YearDummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2  0.063  0.047  0.062  0.084 
FͲtest  17.02  12.82  16.94  21.96 
This table reports crossͲsectional analysis onmarket reaction to the dividend announcement. Eq.5.7 is







and long eventwindows, suggesting delayed announcements are deemed to bemore
doubtful.Consistentwithexpectationthathighervolatilityunderminestheannouncement
effect, idiosyncratic risk, IDIO_RISK, shows significant negative coefficients in all
observation windows. At the same time, firm size, Size, has amarginal influence on
CAR_SHORT,which indicates larger firms have stronger abnormal returns close to the
announcement day.Minority shareholders that focus on growth do not prefer holding




resultsarereported inTable5.7.PanelA indicates that,without firmͲlevelcontrols, the
influenceofUNEXPECTED_DPSissignificantinthreeeventwindows,whilethecontribution
fromUNEXPECTED_EPS is insignificant inall fourwindows.When firmͲlevelcontrolsare
incorporated,asinPanelB,thecoefficientsonUNEXPECTED_DPSaresignificantlypositive
atthe1%levelinCAR_SHORTcolumn,andpositivebutmarginallysignificantat10%level
in CAR_MEDIUM column. Meanwhile, the coefficients on UNEXPECTED_EPS remain






ExpectedSign CAR_PRE pͲvalue CAR_SHORT pͲvalue CAR_MEDIUM pͲvalue CAR_LONG pͲvalue
Intercept  0.1361*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0747*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0242 (0.302) 0.0682* (0.071)
UNEXPECTED_DPS + 0.0729 (0.412) 0.1778*** (0.009) 0.1665* (0.076) 0.2067 (0.138)
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ 0.0010* (0.068) Ͳ0.0003 (0.472) Ͳ0.0006 (0.284) Ͳ0.0010 (0.270)
RPTTIMING Ͳ Ͳ0.0195*** (0.000) 0.0005 (0.832) Ͳ0.0029 (0.314) Ͳ0.0108** (0.015)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ Ͳ1.3140*** (0.000) Ͳ0.4079*** (0.004) Ͳ0.9552*** (0.000) Ͳ2.2132*** (0.000)
Size + Ͳ0.0009 (0.298) 0.0035*** (0.000) 0.0026*** (0.003) 0.0011 (0.435)
LEVERAGE Ͳ Ͳ0.0009 (0.650) 0.0002 (0.962) Ͳ0.0024 (0.220) 0.0014 (0.655)
YearDummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2  0.053  0.023  0.039  0.080 
FͲtest  12.51  7.47  9.42  17.54 










2011). An outstanding earnings announcement is unable to stir up the minority
shareholders.Second,althoughcashdividendspaidto individual investorsaresubjectto
incometax,anunexpectedcashdividendincreaseisapositivesignal,notonlybecauseitis


















ܥܣܴ௜ǡ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܥܱܴܱܰܶܮ̴ܴܫܩܪܶ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧
൅ ߚଷܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܧܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܵܦܴܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଻ܫܦܫ̴ܱܴܫܵܭ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܮܧܸܧܴܣܩܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅෍ߚ௜ ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉ݕ
൅ ࣟ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͷǤͺሻ
Table5.8showsneitherCONTROL_RIGHTSnorUNEXPECTED_DPShasanimpacton
theCARsofpreͲeventandeventwindows,118which canbeexplained in two tiers.One
reasonisthattheinformationaboutUCSs’votingrightsareavailableduringthefinancial
yearifinvestorsfollowfirms’periodicdisclosuresandspecialdisclosuresaftershareblock
trading. In otherwords, these information has been incorporated into the pricing and













Expectedsign CAR_PRE  CAR_SHORT  CAR_MEDIUM  CAR_LONG 
Intercept  0.1525*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0807*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0324 (0.233) 0.0749* (0.091)
CONTROL_RIGHTS Ͳ 0.0009 (0.901) 0.0021 (0.704) Ͳ0.0021 (0.780) 0.0026 (0.822)
UNEXPECTED_DPS + 0.0936 (0.375) 0.0781 (0.325) 0.0926 (0.394) 0.1620 (0.323)
UNEXPECTED_EPS Ͳ 0.0005 (0.391) Ͳ0.0003 (0.467) Ͳ0.0009 (0.154) Ͳ0.0019* (0.060)
RPTTIMING Ͳ Ͳ0.0215*** (0.000) 0.0032 (0.278) Ͳ0.0012 (0.737) Ͳ0.0123** (0.033)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ Ͳ1.4436*** (0.000) Ͳ0.4840*** (0.003) Ͳ1.1237*** (0.000) Ͳ2.3429*** (0.000)
Size + Ͳ0.0012 (0.288) 0.0030*** (0.000) 0.0026** (0.011) 0.0013 (0.452)
LEVERAGE Ͳ Ͳ0.0016 (0.485) 0.0001 (0.943) Ͳ0.0030 (0.190) Ͳ0.0001 (0.967)
YearDummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2  0.057  0.018  0.043  0.089 
FͲtest  11.92  3.96  9.50  18.56 
This table reports crossͲsectional analysis onmarket reaction to the dividend announcement. Eq5.8 is
estimatedwithoutandwithcontrolvariablesusingordinaryleastsquares(OLS)regressionasshowninPanel
AandPanelB,respectively.RefertoTable5.2forvariabledefinitions.Thesampleperiodisfrom1999to2010.
pͲvalues based on White’s heteroscedasticityͲrobust standard error (White, 1980) are reported in
parentheses.*,**and***denotesignificanceat10%,5%and1%levels,respectively.

Eq.5.9 is another derivative from Eq.5.7 to pursue the association between





119 As the regression results of Eq.5.8 suggest there is little impact from CONTROL_RIGHTS on CARs,







ܥܣܴ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦܱܵܧܥܩ௜ǡ௧ ൈ ܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܦܱܵܧܮܩ௜ǡ௧
ൈ ܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦܵܣܯܤ௜ǡ௧ ൈ ܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧
൅ ߚସܦܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁௜ǡ௧ ൈ ܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚହܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܦܲ ௜ܵǡ௧
൅ ߚ଺ܷܰܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܧܲ ௜ܵǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܴܲܶܶܫܯܫܰܩ௜௧ ൅ ߚ଼ܫܦܫ̴ܱܴܫܵܭ௜௧



























 CAR_PRE  CAR_SHORT  CAR_MEDIUM  CAR_LONG 
Intercept 0.1518*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0806*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0307 (0.255) 0.0751* (0.089)
DSOECGXUNEXPECTED_DPS Ͳ0.4364 (0.268) 0.5634 (0.112) 0.5858 (0.193) 0.3533 (0.505)
DSOELGXUNEXPECTED_DPS Ͳ0.2202 (0.416) 0.0786 (0.724) 0.0700 (0.777) Ͳ0.1741 (0.699)
DSAMBXUNEXPECTED_DPS Ͳ0.2127 (0.496) 0.5405** (0.021) 0.7626*** (0.005) 0.5758 (0.271)
DPrivateXUNEXPECTED_DPS Ͳ0.2868 (0.423) 0.5701** (0.047) 0.7195* (0.053) 0.3804 (0.559)
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.3725 (0.264) Ͳ0.4348 (0.104) Ͳ0.5776* (0.075) Ͳ0.2404 (0.672)
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0005 (0.397) Ͳ0.0003 (0.481) Ͳ0.0009 (0.167) Ͳ0.0020* (0.060)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0215*** (0.000) 0.0033 (0.256) Ͳ0.0009 (0.802) Ͳ0.0122** (0.035)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ1.4434*** (0.000) Ͳ0.4910*** (0.003) Ͳ1.1362*** (0.000) Ͳ2.3580*** (0.000)
Size Ͳ0.0011 (0.291) 0.0031*** (0.000) 0.0025** (0.013) 0.0013 (0.407)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.0017 (0.449) 0.0002 (0.926) Ͳ0.0028 (0.224) Ͳ0.0002 (0.963)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.056  0.018  0.045  0.089 
FͲtest 9.93  4.24  8.85  15.60 
This table reports crossͲsectional analysis onmarket reaction to the dividend announcement. Eq5.9 is






thewinsorizationprocessmayalter the fundamentalpatternof thedataset.Therefore,
Eq.5.7isestimatedbasedonthesamplesbeforewinsorization(refertoAppendix5.1)and
theresultsaregenerallyconsistentwiththosefromwinsorizedsample.Second,variance














than stock dividends from retained earnings,due to their different accounting and tax
treatments. Contradictory to past literature, Chinese minority shareholders respond
positively tounexpected cashdividends. This canbe taken as the resultof imbalanced
corporategovernance infrastructure.Chineseminorityshareholderspassivelyregardthe
additional cash dividends as an incremental economic benefit and a positive signal of
decreaseinfreecashflow.Incontrast,theyreactnegativelytoearningsshockbecausethe
earningsmanagementpracticeisquitesignificantinChinesemarket.
Finally,althoughthere is little reactionon the informationofvotingrightsheldby
ultimatecontrollingshareholders,theunexpecteddividendfromfirmswithvarioustypes
ofultimatecontrollingshareholdershasadissimilar influenceon theCAR.Thedividend
shock from SOELG controlled firms is treated as negative,while the unexpected cash














1962,Myers, 1984). Some empirical studies support this proposed inverse relationship
betweencashpayoutandfutureearningsgrowth(Rozeff,1982,FamaandFrench,2002,
IbbotsonandChen,2003).121





























leaving shareholders in those markets more likely to be exposed to agencyͲprincipal
problems(LaPortaetal.,1998,LaPortaetal.,2000b).TheChineseequitymarketusedto
bedominatedbystateͲownedenterprisesandthemanagersoflistedfirmswereappointed
as government officials, but this situation has changed and the diversification of
shareholders’backgroundshas improved.SomestudiessuggestthatChinese listedfirms
havebecomemoreaccustomed tohiringprofessionalsas corporatedirectorsand their
remunerationpackagesarenowcloselylinkedwithoperatingperformance(Xuetal.,2005,
Adithipyangkul et al., 2011). Hence, besides the wellͲknown agency problem existing
141

between large and small shareholders documented in past studies, agency problems
betweenshareholdersandmanagershaveemergedasanewissueintheChinesemarket.






cash dividends, as they are concerned about potential abuse of cash holdings by the
management.Ontheotherhand,minorityshareholdersresponddifferentlytowardsthe
unexpected cash dividends from firms with various types of UCSs, partly due to the
divergent levelsof free cash flowproblems.Both chapterspointout theexistenceand
importanceoftheagencyͲprincipalproblemintheChineseequitymarket.






ratio increases.Notonlydoes it implythevalidityoftheexplanationthatcashdividends
workasadisciplinary function tomitigate theagency cost,but italso incorporates the
considerationofcapitalcost,alsoknownaspeckingorder.Moreover,thepositiveimpact




the agency costs in firmswith greater overͲinvestment potential. Finally, although the
empiricalevidence inChapter5suggestsminorityshareholders reactpositively tostock
dividend announcements, a negative association between stock dividend decisions and
futureearningsgrowth isobserved.Andersonetal. (2011) reporta stockdividend isa
choicewhenafirmisexperiencingpoorliquidityorweakperformance.Thischaptershows
thisnegative implication isnot limitedtothecurrentperiod,butalsostretched intothe
operatingresults inthefollowingfinancialyear(s).Itsuppliesfurtherevidencethatstock
dividendsintheChineseequitymarketaresignalsofearningsmanagement.
One contribution of this chapter is that it extends the studies on the traditional
agencyͲprincipalproblem toanemergingmarketwhereownershipandmanagement is
beingseparatedgradually.Althoughtheconcentrationofownershipchangesslowly,the





of the stock dividend puzzle in the Chinesemarket from the angle of agency costs. In
general,stockdividendsareinclinedtosuggestinferiorfutureperformance.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 proposes the






As per the above discussion, Chinese listed firms encounter both the barriers to
capitalmarketssetbytheCSRCandagencycostsbetweenshareholdersandmanagers.Itis





Instead, the agency cost between shareholders andmanagers is a relatively new
phenomenon in the Chinese market as the affiliation between managers and large
shareholdersisbecomingweaker.ConflictsbetweenshareholdersandmanagersinChinese
firms, reflected by proxy contests, have been under the spotlight in recent years, and
entrepreneurs have become more and more independent from the large (founding)
shareholders.122Comparedwith thepeckingordertheory,the freecash flowhypothesis
stemmed from agency costs which were attracting increased interest as a corporate
governanceissueintheChinesemarket.
Following previous studieswhich documentmixed empirical evidence about the
















in investment sprees and pick up projects with negative net present value, while









As per the retained earnings hypothesis based on the US Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP), bonus shares have the function of signalling future
performance.TheGAAPrequirethefirmtoreducetheretainedearningsaccountbythe
marketvalueofthestockdividendifitisclassifiedasasmallstockdividend(nomorethan






futureearningsgrowth is significantamong firmsannouncingabalanceddualdividend.




stockdividends fromretainedearnings (SDRE)andstockdividends fromcapitalreserves
(SDCR). Although neither of them generates any immediate economic benefit to
shareholders,theyarequitepopularandpreferredbyChineseminorityshareholders,as




may facilitate and exacerbate the agency cost of free cash flow if managers avoid
distributing excessive cash holdings to shareholders. Moreover, the stock dividend
















to the financial industry, as financial companies have special features in their financial
statements,especiallysizeandleverage;(ii)firmswithmissingfinancialinformationwillnot
be included in the sample; (iii) companieswhich reportnonͲpositiveequitywillalsobe





Total Cashonly CashwithSDCRonly CashwithSDREonly CashwithbothSDREandSDCR Others
8,475 4,277(50.5%) 670(7.9%) 192(2.3%) 241(2.8%) 3,095(36.5%)
Thistableprovidesasummaryofsamplefirmsbythetypeofdividendpolicybetween2001and2010.The



















FUTURE_EPSG indicates managers not only achieve efficiency in operation but also
successfullyutilizefinancialleveragetomanagethecostofcapitalandtaxpayable.
Thesecondparameteristhefuturegrowthinearningsbeforeinterestandtax(EBIT),
FUTURE_EBITG,definedas thedifferencebetweenEBITt+1andEBITt then scaledby the
absolute value of EBITt. Different from EPS, EBITmeasures the operating profitability
withoutthe influenceoffinancialdecisions.FirmswithhighEBITgrowthexhibitastrong
capability of properly choosing investment projects. Hence, strong FUTURE_EBITG is
expectedtobepositivelyassociatedwithaloweragencycostoffreecashflow.
6.3.3. Independentvariables
The key independent variable is the cash dividend payout ratio, CASH_PAYOUT,
defined as the cash dividend per share scaledby earnings per share.According to the
discussioninthehypothesisdevelopment,largecashdividenddistributionisexpectedto







the regressionmodel.Additionally, thechange incashpayout ratio,ȴCASH_PAYOUT, is
introducedasasupplementarymeasurementofcashdividendpolicybecausethelevelof
cash payout ratio may not be stationary. The coefficients on CASH_PAYOUT and
ȴCASH_PAYOUTareanticipatedtobepositive,whileCASH_PAYOUT2isexpectedtoexhibit
anegativecoefficient.According to theChinaSecuritiesLaw,dividendpayout, including
bothcashdividendsandstockdividendsfromretainedearnings,shouldnotexceedthenet








measurement of the overͲinvestment problem.127 Higher TOBIN’S_Q implies a higher
agencycostof freecash flow,so it isexpected toshowanegativesign.Firmsize,SIZE,
definedasthelogarithmoftotalassetsasofyeart,isexpectedtohaveapositiveinfluence
ontheprobabilityandmagnitudeofdividends,thatis,largerfirmsareinclinedtopaymore
dividends (DeAngelo et al., 2004). In the meantime, the expected profitability,









the control for clientele effect, because firmswith a high dividend yieldmaywell be
neglectedbysophisticatedinvestorswhoprefergrowthopportunity(GrahamandKumar,
2006).Lackofsophisticatedinvestorsmeansthefirmmaybeexposedtomoreagencycost,
so the coefficient on DIVYIELD is anticipated to be negative. Finally, potential mean




































PanelA:FUTURE_EPSG N Mean St.Err. tͲtest pͲvalue
Cashonly 4,277 0.1290 0.0121 10.663 0.0000
CashwithSDCRonly 670 Ͳ0.1701 0.0221 Ͳ9.5701 1.0000
CashwithSDREonly 192 Ͳ0.1388 0.0349 Ͳ3.9787 1.0000
CashwithSDREandSDCR 241 Ͳ0.2396 0.0272 Ͳ8.8021 1.0000
PanelB:FUTURE_EBITG N Mean St.Err. tͲtest pͲvalue
Cashonly 4,277 0.1952 0.0093 20.999 0.0000
CashwithSDCRonly 670 0.2574 0.0222 11.624 0.0000
CashwithSDREonly 192 0.1212 0.0374 3.2409 0.0007






payerswith simultaneous stock dividends exhibit significant divergence betweenmean
FUTURE_EBITGandmeanFUTURE_EPSG.Specifically,cashpayerswithSDCRhavea far
better mean FUTURE_EBITG, but cash payers with SDRE only report worse means
FUTURE_EBITG.Theseoutcomesindicatethatstockdividendpayers’netprofitsaremore















CASH_PAYOUT and EXPECTED_ROA are positively correlated with FUTURE_EPSG and
FUTURE_EBITG, in all three panels. Instead, TOBIN’S_Q reports a significant negative
correlationcoefficientwithFUTURE_EPSG inPanelC,butnosignificantcorrelationwith









N=4,277 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
FUTURE_EPSG 0.1290 0.7915 Ͳ0.5074 Ͳ0.2000 0.0822 0.3582 0.8667
FUTURE_EBITG 0.1952 0.6078 Ͳ0.3889 Ͳ0.1077 0.1400 0.4117 0.7991
CASH_PAYOUT 0.4073 0.2161 0.1477 0.2353 0.3781 0.5443 0.7330
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.0333 0.2680 Ͳ0.2353 Ͳ0.0928 0.0057 0.1470 0.3680
SIZE 21.8190 1.1432 20.5352 20.9981 21.6422 22.4712 23.3254
EXPECTED_ROA 0.0124 0.0119 0.0013 0.0045 0.0096 0.0176 0.0284
DIVYIELD 0.0151 0.0116 0.0038 0.0065 0.0116 0.0203 0.0316
TOBIN’S_Q 2.0505 1.1862 1.0345 1.2439 1.6859 2.4480 3.5039
CURRENT_EPSG 0.3054 1.1440 Ͳ0.4444 Ͳ0.2000 0.0588 0.3573 1.0567
CURRENT_EBITG 0.3557 0.9215 Ͳ0.2700 Ͳ0.0533 0.1614 0.4396 0.9671
FUTURE_AG 0.3192 0.4097 Ͳ0.0144 0.0583 0.1638 0.3915 1.0798
PanelB:Dualdividendpayerssample
N=433 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
FUTURE_EPSG Ͳ0.1973 0.4394 Ͳ0.7000 Ͳ0.4595 Ͳ0.2500 0.0057 0.3247
FUTURE_EBITG 0.1990 0.5712 Ͳ0.3859 Ͳ0.1011 0.1512 0.4378 0.7316
CASH_PAYOUT 0.1645 0.1202 0.0495 0.0782 0.1301 0.2212 0.3422
ȴCASH_PAYOUT Ͳ0.0923 0.2214 Ͳ0.4065 Ͳ0.1919 Ͳ0.0575 0.0545 0.1354
STOCK_PAYOUT 0.4061 0.1887 0.1675 0.2636 0.3966 0.5332 0.6825
SIZE 21.9081 1.0625 20.5354 21.0702 21.8215 22.6755 23.4479
EXPECTED_ROA 0.0198 0.0178 0.0034 0.0079 0.0152 0.0260 0.0408
DIVYIELD 0.0068 0.0071 0.0013 0.0024 0.0047 0.0086 0.0146
TOBIN’S_Q 2.9526 2.1180 1.2301 1.5711 2.2741 3.4306 5.7565
CURRENT_EPSG 0.7623 2.1760 Ͳ0.3132 Ͳ0.0886 0.1769 0.5993 1.6807
CURRENT_EBITG 0.8388 1.8178 Ͳ0.0628 0.1409 0.3643 0.7497 1.7522
FUTURE_AG 0.4223 0.4643 0.0038 0.1039 0.2452 0.5732 1.2017
PanelC:CashͲpayerwithSDCRonlysample
N=670 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
FUTURE_EPSG Ͳ0.1701 0.4601 Ͳ0.6372 Ͳ0.4444 Ͳ0.2000 0.0000 0.3433
FUTURE_EBITG 0.2574 0.5732 Ͳ0.3335 Ͳ0.0330 0.1820 0.4921 0.8497
CASH_PAYOUT 0.3441 0.2112 0.1059 0.1697 0.2901 0.4731 0.6652
ȴCASH_PAYOUT Ͳ0.0169 0.2769 Ͳ0.2879 Ͳ0.1305 Ͳ0.0186 0.0905 0.2958
SIZE 21.6664 1.1202 20.3113 20.8578 21.5090 22.3239 23.1747
EXPECTED_ROA 0.0150 0.0126 0.0023 0.0059 0.0130 0.0201 0.0301
DIVYIELD 0.0125 0.0106 0.0027 0.0046 0.0091 0.0170 0.0271
TOBIN’S_Q 2.6425 1.7212 1.1443 1.4155 2.1321 3.2739 4.8258
CURRENT_EPSG 0.3784 1.3189 Ͳ0.4000 Ͳ0.1731 0.0956 0.4706 1.1156
CURRENT_EBITG 0.5147 1.0466 Ͳ0.1493 0.0582 0.2991 0.6186 1.1455
FUTURE_AG 0.4222 0.4606 0.0281 0.1015 0.2289 0.5954 1.2126
PanelD:CashͲpayersample
N=5,380 Mean St.Dev. 10thPctl. 25thPctl. 50thPctl. 75thPctl. 90thPctl.
FUTURE_EPSG 0.0637 0.7072 Ͳ0.5779 Ͳ0.2884 0.0237 0.3077 0.7694
FUTURE_EBITG 0.2036 0.5966 Ͳ0.3859 Ͳ0.1009 0.1464 0.4247 0.8017
CASH_PAYOUT 0.3799 0.2198 0.1177 0.2046 0.3465 0.5184 0.7130
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.0170 0.2670 Ͳ0.2557 Ͳ0.1035 0.0002 0.1292 0.3418
SIZE 21.8055 1.1295 20.5090 20.9843 21.6418 22.4716 23.3107
EXPECTED_ROA 0.0133 0.0126 0.0016 0.0048 0.0103 0.0188 0.0297
DIVYIELD 0.0141 0.0114 0.0032 0.0057 0.0107 0.0190 0.0301
TOBIN’S_Q 2.1931 1.3628 1.0516 1.2832 1.7615 2.6160 3.8454
CURRENT_EPSG 0.3503 1.2602 Ͳ0.4286 Ͳ0.1927 0.0712 0.3916 1.1056
CURRENT_EBITG 0.4140 1.0242 Ͳ0.2443 Ͳ0.0227 0.1885 0.4906 1.0550






PanelA:CashͲonlypayers FUTURE_EPSG FUTURE_EBITG CASH_PAYOUT ȴCASH_PAYOUT SIZE EXPECTED_ROA DIVYIELD TOBIN’S_Q CURRENT_EPSG CURRENT_EBITG
FUTURE_EBITG 0.8474*         
CASH_PAYOUT 0.0403* 0.0494*        
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.0410* 0.0261* 0.3154*       
SIZE 0.0179 0.0106 Ͳ0.2065* Ͳ0.0522*      
EXPECTED_ROA 0.1748* 0.1660* Ͳ0.0418* Ͳ0.0816* 0.0821*     
DIVYIELD Ͳ0.0178 Ͳ0.0244 0.4511* 0.0740* 0.1482* 0.2064*    
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.0201 Ͳ0.0227 0.0325 Ͳ0.0070 Ͳ0.2844* 0.3621* Ͳ0.3347*   
CURRENT_EPSG 0.0245 0.0208 Ͳ0.1109* Ͳ0.0200 0.0267 0.1146* Ͳ0.0453* 0.0634*  
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ0.0049 Ͳ0.0159 Ͳ0.1253* Ͳ0.0163 0.0564* 0.1337* Ͳ0.0227 0.0690* 0.7448* 
FUTURE_AG 0.0686* 0.1478* Ͳ0.2010* Ͳ0.0477* 0.1756* 0.1088* Ͳ0.1362* 0.1627* 0.0721* 0.0761*
PanelB:CashͲpayers FUTURE_EPSG FUTURE_EBITG CASH_PAYOUT ȴCASH_PAYOUT SIZE EXPECTED_ROA DIVYIELD TOBIN’S_Q CURRENT_EPSG CURRENT_EBITG
FUTURE_EBITG 0.8193*         
CASH_PAYOUT 0.0878* 0.0488*        
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.0592* 0.0254 0.3313*       
SIZE 0.0237 0.0198 Ͳ0.1945* Ͳ0.0336      
EXPECTED_ROA 0.1520* 0.1764* Ͳ0.0766* Ͳ0.0877* 0.0609*     
DIVYIELD 0.0181 Ͳ0.0221 0.5008* 0.1087* 0.1355* 0.1478*    
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.0539* Ͳ0.0135 Ͳ0.0346 Ͳ0.0383* Ͳ0.2842* 0.3989* Ͳ0.3467*   
CURRENT_EPSG Ͳ0.0020 0.0137 Ͳ0.1255* Ͳ0.0349 0.0300 0.1101* Ͳ0.0590* 0.0624*  
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ0.0246 Ͳ0.0130 Ͳ0.1496* Ͳ0.0264 0.0548* 0.1401* Ͳ0.0533* 0.0936* 0.7533* 







This section investigateswhether the earnings growth is affected by firmͲspecific
features.FollowingFamaandFrench (1993), thecashͲpayer (cashͲonlypayer)sample is
sortedindescendingorderofindividualindependentvariables,andthetop(bottom)three
deciles are termed ‘high’ (‘low’) subͲgroups.130 Tests are conducted for statistically
significantdifferences in themeanFUTURE_EPSGandFUTURE_EBITGacross these subͲ
groups,whicharereportedinTable6.6.
PanelAofTable6.6suggestsseveralappealingresultsforFUTURE_EPSG.Withinthe
cashͲonly payer sample, first, the high CASH_PAYOUT subͲgroup has a higher mean
FUTURE_EPSG (0.1601) than thatof the lowCASH_PAYOUTsubͲgroup (0.0728),and the
difference in the mean of FUTURE_EPSG between the high and low subͲgroups is
statisticallysignificantatthe1%level.Further,thehigherȴCASH_PAYOUTsubͲgroupalso
reportsahighermeanFUTURE_EPSG(0.1940)thanthatofthe lowȴCASH_PAYOUTsubͲ
group (0.1022),and theirdifference isalsosignificantat the1% level.Second,expected
profitabilitydoesprovidesomeguidancetothefutureearningsgrowth,asthedifference
betweenthehighandlowEXPECTED_ROAsubͲgroupsisstatisticallysignificantatthe1%
level. Third, firms with larger SIZE or faster FUTURE_AG are inclined to have better














































CASH_PAYOUT 0.1601 0.0728 0.0873 2.70*** 0.1303 Ͳ0.0216 0.1519 5.98***
    (2.65)***    (7.70)***
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.1940 0.1022 0.0918 2.78*** 0.1414 0.0241 0.1172 4.44***
    (2.76)***    (5.13)**
SIZE 0.1582 0.0862 0.0720 2.37** 0.0920 0.0247 0.0673 2.76***
    (2.73)***    (2.57)**
EXPECTED_ROA 0.2769 Ͳ0.0306 0.3075 9.13*** 0.1772 Ͳ0.0674 0.2446 9.26***
    (11.58)***    (10.72)***
DIVYIELD 0.1140 0.1583 Ͳ0.0443 Ͳ1.34 0.0814 0.0328 0.0486 1.90*
    (0.11)    (5.36)***
TOBIN’S_Q 0.0923 0.1753 Ͳ0.0830 Ͳ2.59*** Ͳ0.0001 0.1122 Ͳ0.1123 Ͳ4.45***
    (Ͳ2.30)**    (Ͳ5.31)***
CURRENT_EPSG 0.1634 0.1485 0.0149 0.43 0.0654 0.0890 Ͳ0.0237 Ͳ0.87
    (1.46)    (Ͳ0.89)
FUTURE_AG 0.2182 Ͳ0.0608 0.2790 8.75*** 0.1295 Ͳ0.0883 0.2178 8.50***
    (10.07)***    (9.21)***
PanelB–FutureEBITgrowth(FUTURE_EBITG)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.2269 0.1503 0.0766 3.11*** 0.2411 0.1703 0.0708 3.28***
    (3.28)***    (3.14)***
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 0.2420 0.1752 0.0668 2.67*** 0.2522 0.1833 0.0689 3.11***
    (2.13)**    (2.55)**
SIZE 0.2085 0.1738 0.0348 1.47 0.2219 0.1790 0.0429 2.07*
    (1.76)*    (2.46)**
EXPECTED_ROA 0.3037 0.0828 0.2209 8.75*** 0.3205 0.0926 0.2280 10.28***
    (10.07)***    (11.42)***
DIVYIELD 0.1760 0.2216 Ͳ0.0456 Ͳ1.83* 0.1898 0.2208 Ͳ0.0310 Ͳ1.45
    (Ͳ0.15)    (0.10)
TOBIN’S_Q 0.1663 0.2200 Ͳ0.0536 Ͳ2.18** 0.1763 0.2156 Ͳ0.0392 Ͳ1.86*
    (Ͳ2.41)**    (Ͳ2.18)**
EBG 0.1333 0.1302 0.0030 0.09 0.2105 0.1945 0.0160 Ͳ0.70
    (1.28)    (1.77)*
FUTURE_AG 0.3311 Ͳ0.0003 0.3314 13.44*** 0.3438 0.0062 0.3376 15.62***













ൌ ߚ௜ ൅ ߚଵܥܽݏ݄ܲܽݕ݋ݑݐܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௜ǡ௧ଶ
൅ ߚଶܥܽݏ݄ܲܽݕ݋ݑݐܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܴܱܣ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚହܦܫܸܻܫܧܮܦ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܱܶܤܫܰԢ̴ܵܳ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜ǡ௧
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Where Future EarningsGrowth refers either to FUTURE_EPSG or FUTURE_EBITG;
CashPayoutMeasurement refers toCASH_PAYOUT andȴCASH_PAYOUT. Eq.6.1 is the
modelwhich conjectures there is a potential nonͲlinear relationship between earnings
growth and cash dividend distribution.When the earningsmeasurement is proxied by
ȴCASH_PAYOUT,Eq.6.1isestimatedusinganordinaryleastsquares(OLS)modeladjusted
forheteroscedasticity (White,1980);otherwise,Eq.6.1 isestimatedusinga fixedeffect












 Expectedsigns (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue (6) pͲvalue
Intercept  Ͳ0.098** (0.012) 2.629*** (0.008) 0.125*** (0.000) Ͳ0.160 (0.575) Ͳ0.228*** (0.001) 1.951* (0.050)
CASH_PAYOUT + 0.557*** (0.000) 1.330*** (0.000)     1.264*** (0.000) 2.806*** (0.000)
CASH_PAYOUT2 Ͳ         Ͳ0.740** (0.030) Ͳ1.480*** (0.000)
ȴCASH_PAYOUT +     0.121** (0.030) 0.216*** (0.000)    
SIZE Ͳ   Ͳ0.139*** (0.001)   Ͳ0.014 (0.265)   Ͳ0.121*** (0.005)
EXPECTED_ROA +   23.761*** (0.000)   15.623*** (0.000)   24.208*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ   Ͳ28.834*** (0.000)   Ͳ10.596*** (0.000)   Ͳ30.214*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ   Ͳ0.145*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.084*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.150*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG Ͳ   Ͳ0.008 (0.553)   0.001 (0.914)   Ͳ0.004 (0.761)
FUTURE_AG +   0.354*** (0.000)   0.492*** (0.000)   0.364*** (0.000)
YearDummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R2  0.014  0.185  0.001  0.133  0.016  0.192 
FͲtest  34.252  28.862  4.702  33.873  20.775  28.591 
PanelB:FUTURE_EBITG
 Expectedsigns (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue (6) pͲvalue
Intercept  Ͳ0.019 (0.525) 0.045 (0.954) 0.193*** (0.000) Ͳ0.262 (0.203) Ͳ0.149** (0.004) Ͳ0.520 (0.507)
CASH_PAYOUT + 0.525*** (0.000) 1.113*** (0.000)     1.227*** (0.000) 2.419*** (0.000)
CASH_PAYOUT2 Ͳ         Ͳ0.735*** (0.005) Ͳ1.309*** (0.000)
ȴCASH_PAYOUT +     0.059 (0.152) 0.153*** (0.000)    
SIZE Ͳ   Ͳ0.029 (0.392)   Ͳ0.014 (0.118)   Ͳ0.014 (0.677)
EXPECTED_ROA +   19.028*** (0.000)   11.357*** (0.000)   19.398*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ   Ͳ22.779*** (0.000)   Ͳ8.726*** (0.000)   Ͳ24.014*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ   Ͳ0.142*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.073*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.147*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ   Ͳ0.022* (0.071)   Ͳ0.025** (0.025)   Ͳ0.018 (0.143)
FUTURE_AG +   0.595*** (0.000)   0.701*** (0.000)   0.605*** (0.000)
YearDummies  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R2  0.021  0.237  0  0.189  0.023  0.246 







As per columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on CASH_PAYOUT are positive and




shown in rows (5) and (6), because the coefficient on ȴCASH_PAYOUT is positive and
statisticallysignificantatthe1%level.Further,accordingtorows(5)and(6),thecoefficients
on CASH_PAYOUT2 are significantly negative,while the coefficients on CASH_PAYOUT
maintainapositivesignwithstrongsignificance.133ThefindingsofPanelAareunderpinned
by Panel B with FUTURE_EBITG as an earnings growth measurement, in which all
coefficientsonkeyindependentvariablesshowthesamesignsandsignificancelevels.


























mean a low dividend yield is associated with superior future earnings growth. As







reports significantlypositivecoefficients inall regression results.Theoutcomes indicate
thattheearningsgrowthbenefitsasthepaceofgrowthinfirmsizeincreases,butnotthe














































Intercept 1.023* (0.078) Ͳ10.109 (0.272) 0.474 (0.418) Ͳ0.190 (0.893)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.932*** (0.000) Ͳ0.242 (0.877) 0.461** (0.047) 1.133*** (0.005)
SIZE Ͳ0.054** (0.029) 0.412 (0.240) Ͳ0.021 (0.417) 0.012 (0.850)
EXPECTED_ROA 15.985*** (0.000) 80.492* (0.071) 18.167*** (0.000) 21.676** (0.022)
DIVYIELD Ͳ27.833*** (0.000) 92.731 (0.478) Ͳ8.860*** (0.009) Ͳ62.236** (0.027)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.108 (0.130) Ͳ0.044 (0.944) Ͳ0.216*** (0.005) Ͳ0.161** (0.049)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.035 (0.346) Ͳ0.696 (0.513) 0.031 (0.366) 0.094 (0.163)
FUTURE_AG 0.672*** (0.003) Ͳ2.071 (0.530) 0.420*** (0.005) 0.757** (0.010)
N 1,283  1,283  1,283  1,283 
R2 0.261  0.336  0.263  0.231 
FͲtest 52.997  20.712  783.91  19.4 












Intercept 1.108** (0.043) Ͳ5.353 (0.358) 0.363 (0.444) 0.007 (0.995)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.862*** (0.000) 0.750*** (0.001) 0.554*** (0.001) 1.031*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.052** (0.012) 0.091 (0.325) Ͳ0.016 (0.451) 0.000 (0.996)
EXPECTED_ROA 13.955*** (0.001) 33.485** (0.015) 15.625*** (0.000) 20.596*** (0.001)
DIVYIELD Ͳ29.892*** (0.000) Ͳ39.536* (0.087) Ͳ10.669*** (0.000) Ͳ41.801** (0.028)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.114* (0.067) 2.677 (0.405) Ͳ0.225*** (0.000) Ͳ0.151*** (0.003)
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ0.003 (0.937) 0.572 (0.224) 0.027 (0.378) 0.034 (0.529)
FUTURE_AG 0.899*** (0.000) Ͳ0.292 (0.812) 0.684*** (0.000) 0.820*** (0.001)
N 1,283  1,283  1,283  1,283 
R2 0.34  0.359  0.304  0.261 
FͲtest 59.511  54.24  37.782  25.429 
ThistablereportstheestimationresultsofEq.6.1(linearversion)forFUTURE_EPSGandFUTURE_EBITG,using












explanatory variables in row (4) are significant, which means this result from the
Fama_FrenchtwoͲstepprocedureisnotreliable.SimilartoPanelA,bothestimationresults








This sectionwill testHypothesis 6.2, the association between the stock dividend
announcementandfutureearningsgrowth,basedonthesampleofallcashpayers.Model
specification, Eq.6.2, is based on Eq.6.1 and incorporates STOCK_PAYOUT and dummy
variablesSDCRandSDREwhich indicate theexistenceof stockdividends from retained
earningsandstockdividendsfromcapitalreserve.
ܨݑݐݑݎ݁ܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜ǡ௧
ൌ ߚ௜ ൅ ߚଵܲܽݕ݋ݑݐܯ݁ܽݏݑݎ݁݉݁݊ݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଶܵܦܴܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଷܵܦܥܴ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚସܵܫܼܧ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚହܧܺܲܧܥܶܧܦ̴ܴܱܣ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܦܫܸܻܫܧܮܦ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܱܶܤܫܰԢ̴ܵܳ௜ǡ௧
൅ ߚ଼ܥݑݎݎ݁݊ݐܧܽݎ݊݅݊݃ݏܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߚଽܨܷܷܴܶܧ̴ܣܩ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺܧݍǤ ͸Ǥʹሻ
Where futureearningsgrowthrefers toeitherFUTURE_EPSGorFUTURE_EBITG;payout




indicates the coefficient on CASH_PAYOUT maintains a positive sign and statistical
significance.Every10% increase inCASH_PAYOUTwill leadtoan11.95% increase inthe
futureEPSgrowth,andtheresultissignificantatthe1%level.ButbothcoefficientsonSDCR




with the anticipation that stock dividends, from either source, undermine the future
earnings growth. When stock dividend from retained earnings is measured by
STOCK_PAYOUT,aspercolumn(3),itscoefficientisnegativeandstatisticallysignificantat
1% level. Finally,when CASH_PAYOUT is substituted by ȴCASH_PAYOUT, as shown in




 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.077*** (0.009) 2.874*** (0.000) 2.914*** (0.000) 0.119*** (0.000) Ͳ0.227 (0.305)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.534*** (0.000) 1.195*** (0.000) 1.207*** (0.000)    
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.104** (0.016) 0.176*** (0.000)
SDRE Ͳ0.148*** (0.000) Ͳ0.202*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.157*** (0.000) Ͳ0.251*** (0.000)
SDCR Ͳ0.295*** (0.000) Ͳ0.272*** (0.000) Ͳ0.280*** (0.000) Ͳ0.261*** (0.000) Ͳ0.275*** (0.000)
STOCK_PAYOUT     Ͳ0.399*** (0.000)    
SIZE   Ͳ0.150*** (0.000) Ͳ0.152*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.010 (0.316)
EXPECTED_ROA   18.651*** (0.000) 18.561*** (0.000)   13.132*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD   Ͳ25.643*** (0.000) Ͳ25.676*** (0.000)   Ͳ8.978*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q   Ͳ0.113*** (0.000) Ͳ0.115*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.067*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG   0.002 (0.848) 0.001 (0.884)   Ͳ0.003 (0.735)
FUTURE_AG   0.348*** (0.000) 0.351*** (0.000)   0.456*** (0.000)
YearDummies No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.053  0.221  0.22  0.031  0.163 
FͲtest 91.623  48.69  48.257  90.624  57.904 
PanelBFUTURE_EBITG
 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.019 (0.458) 0.573 (0.409) 0.585 (0.400) 0.192*** (0.000) Ͳ0.498*** (0.005)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.566*** (0.000) 1.122*** (0.000) 1.132*** (0.000)    
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.063* (0.084) 0.147*** (0.000)
SDRE Ͳ0.020 (0.591) Ͳ0.074** (0.028)   Ͳ0.032 (0.293) Ͳ0.120*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.056** (0.036) 0.067*** (0.005) 0.061** (0.010) 0.077*** (0.001) 0.054*** (0.008)
STOCK_PAYOUT     Ͳ0.091 (0.270)    
SIZE   Ͳ0.055* (0.069) Ͳ0.056* (0.066)   Ͳ0.006 (0.438)
EXPECTED_ROA   16.585*** (0.000) 16.516*** (0.000)   10.730*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD   Ͳ22.667*** (0.000) Ͳ22.621*** (0.000)   Ͳ8.285*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q   Ͳ0.122*** (0.000) Ͳ0.123*** (0.000)   Ͳ0.060*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EBITG   Ͳ0.012 (0.197) Ͳ0.013 (0.183)   Ͳ0.021** (0.024)
FUTURE_AG   0.619*** (0.000) 0.619*** (0.000)   0.722*** (0.000)
YearDummies No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.026  0.249  0.248  0.002  0.202 
FͲtest 29.929  48.822  48.685  4.651  55.321 
This table reports the estimation resultsof Eq.6.1 for FUTURE_EPSG and FUTURE_EBITG. Equationswith
CASH_PAYOUTareestimatedusingafixedeffectmodeladjustedforheteroscedasticity(White,1980),while








maintains a negative sign butwith less significance, the coefficient on SDCR becomes
significantlypositive, in linewith thedescriptive statistics shown inTable6.4 that cash
payerswithSDCRonlyexhibithighestmeanFUTURE_EBITG.ThedivergencebetweenPanel
AandPanelBproposesthedifferentimplicationofSDCRandSDRE.Becauseitcreatesno
tax liabilities on the shareholders, SDCR may be used to imply improvement in the












DIVYIELD on the future earnings growth are extremely significant, but in opposite
















into High/Medium/Low subͲgroups based on the third and seventh deciles of
CASH_PAYOUTandȴCASH_PAYOUT.Eq.6.1isappliedtoeachsubͲsampleusingtheFamaͲ
Macbeth (1973) twoͲstep procedure and the results are presented in Appendix 6.3.
Accordingtothefirstthreerowsofeachpanel,thecoefficientsonCASH_PAYOUTareall




on future earnings growth is only valid in the high ȴCASH_PAYOUT subgroup, which









































influenceon the futureearningsgrowth,but there isno clearevidence to suggest that
earningsgrowthshowsmeanreversion.
There is also some evidence that the above documented positive relationship
weakensasthecashpayoutratioincreases,whichcanbeattributedtothecostofcapital.
Inparticular,inahighlyͲregulatedmarket,theChineselistedfirmsareinclinedtopreferthe






In contrast, stock dividends in theChinesemarket are negatively associatedwith
future earnings growth. Different from the potential signalling function in developed
markets(Crawfordetal.,2005,BechmannandRaaballe,2007),thestockdividendpractice






















a relevantexplanationof the corporategovernance issuesarising in theChineseequity
market.Thisthesispresentsrecentevidenceregardingtherelationshipbetweendividend
payoutpolicyandcorporatecontrolrights,and the interactionbetweenstockdividends
and futureearningsgrowth. Italso suppliesevidenceon the relationbetweendividend
policy,corporatecontrolrightsandstockabnormalreturns.









andHeaney, 2007).As a legacyof the economic reforms inChina,ultimate controlling
shareholders,similartothe largestshareholders indevelopedmarkets,havebecomean
important force intheChineseequitymarket.Thesecontrollersexercisethe functionof
monitoring the listed firm, as well as supporting the controlled entity financially, if
necessary.Meanwhile,as theChineseequitymarket isstrictly regulatedby theChinese
authorities, listed firmsneed todesignpayoutpolicycarefully taking intoaccountmany
factors,suchasthepossibilityofhavingtoraisefutureequitycapital.Theeffectivenessof
cashdividends as a solution to the agencyproblem is reflected in the improvement in
profitabilityafterthemanagementhasdistributedcashholdingstoshareholders.Further,
the dividend announcement provides new information to the secondary market and
investors to enable an assessment ofwhether the dividend announcement signals any
changeinthefirm’soperatingperformance.Therefore,theinfluenceofadividendpolicyis
associatedwith theagencyͲprincipalproblemandotherkey issues incorporate finance,
suchasfirmvaluationandtheoperation’sefficiency.
Thischapterisorganizedasfollows.Section7.2outlineskeyfindingsgeneratedfrom
theempirical researchpertaining to the threemain topicsofresearch.Asmentioned in
Chapter2, the first topic is the relationshipbetween corporate control rights,dividend
policyandsubsequentequityfinancing.Thesecondtopicconcentratesontherelationship
















propensity andmagnitude, and corporate control rights. Specifically, there is a
significant linear relationship between the propensity and magnitude of cash
dividendpayouts,andthecontrolrightsheldbyultimatecontrollingshareholders.
With a higher percentage of control rights, the underlying firm has a higher
probability ofmaking a cash dividend distribution, aswell as payingmore cash
dividendsoutofcurrentnetprofits.Whenthecontrolrightsarerelativelylow,that
is, less than 20 per cent, both the propensity andmagnitude of cash dividends
decrease. The proposed explanation to this outcome is that the controlling




iii. There is also some support for the argument that various ultimate controlling





iv. In termsofcashpayoutmagnitude, lessdivergence isobservedamong the subͲ
groups with different ultimate controlling shareholders. Different from the
traditional viewpoint that Chinese firms controlled by Private investors are less
concernedwithcashdistribution,theexistenceofPrivatecontrollersenhancesthe
magnitudeof cashdividendpayouts,which is attributed to theeffortofPrivate
investors to use cash dividends to tackle the agency costs of free cash flow. In
contrast, SAMBͲcontrolled firms are more likely to pay lessfewer/lower cash
dividends as theirmanagers are closely affiliatedwith SAMB controllers,which
exacerbatetheexpropriationoffunds.
v. FirmͲspecific features, such asprofitability, firm size and financial leverage, also








chapter. The research extends thework of Cheng et al. (2009) and Chen et al.
(2009a)totestwhetherthetraditionaldividendannouncementeffectissignificant
androbust,basedonasamplefrom1999to2010.
ii. Both the impacts from a cash dividend shock and stock dividend decisions are
pursued,wherethecashdividendshockismeasuredbyunexpectedcashdividends
adjustedforindustryfactors,andstockdividendsarerepresentedbytwodummy
variables, depending on the source of the stock dividends (capital reserves or
retainedearnings).




improves the cumulative abnormal return around the event window, which




unexpected cash dividends, suggesting that they take the increase in cash
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rightsandstockabnormalreturn is investigated.The justification isthat investors
areconcernedbeyondtheunexpectedcashdividend,however,thecontrollerofthe
firmmaylendfinancialsupporttotheunderlyinglistedfirm.
ii. The empirical results indicate that although level of control rights have little
influenceonthestockabnormalreturn,thetypesofcontrollingshareholders,along
























cash dividend, as well as changes, and the future earnings growth, which is
consistentwiththenotionthatthecashdividendworksasasolutiontoreducethe
freecashflowhoardedbythemanagement.Inaddition,thisrelationship ismore
significant when the underlying firms are exposed to more overͲinvestment
problems,whichisproxiedbyhigherTobin’sQ.
iv. There is someevidence that lends support toapotentialnonͲlinear relationship
betweencurrentcashpayoutandfutureearningsgrowth.The justificationofthis







market. The relationship between current stock dividend decisions and future
earningsgrowthisalsoinvestigated.Theempiricalresultsshowsomedifferences,
dependingonthemeasurementofearningsgrowth.Whenitismeasuredbygrowth
in EPS, stock dividends, from either capital reserves or retained earnings, are







Thedividendpayoutpolicy iswidelydebated inthecorporatefinance literature, in
isolationandalsoinconnectionwithothermodernfinancetopics,suchasfirmvaluation
and corporate governance mechanisms. In recent years, academic researchers have
concentratedonthefunctionofcashdividendsasamechanismtomitigatetheagencycost
stemming from the separation of ownership andmanagement. The agency problem is









between dividend payout policy and future earnings growth; and (iii) the relationship
betweenstockabnormalreturn,dividendpolicyandcorporatecontrolrights.
This thesis contributes to the corporate finance literature on the Chinese equity
market,especiallyintheareasofdividendpolicyanditsinfluenceoncorporategovernance
andassetpricing.With theexistenceofultimate controlling shareholders, thedividend
policyisdesignedtomitigatetheagencyproblembetweenshareholdersandmanagement,
becausetheultimatecontrollingshareholdersneedtoexercisemoreefforttomonitorthe
firm’s performance. Apparently, this extramonitoring work has to be rewarded with
economicbenefit,whichexplainsapositive relationshipbetween thecontrol rightsand





with cash distribution. The policy does have some influence on the likelihood and
magnitudeofcorporatedividendpayouts,butthechangesaremorelikelytobetheresult





decreasing the free cash flow controlledbymanagersand, consequently,alleviates the
agency costs. Therefore, this research extends to the relationship between dividend
payoutsand futureearningsgrowth.Theempirical results support theviewpoint thata
higher cash dividend payout is associated with better future earnings growth. This




shockandearningsshock,aswellaswhether thecorporatecontrol rights influence the
stockabnormalreturnsurroundingdividendandearningsannouncements.Althoughthe




less concernedabout the cashdividenddecisionandmore focusedon the capitalgain,
which is in linewith the findings inCheng et al. (2009). Thus, theCSRC regulations to
improve the cash dividend are less appealing to minority shareholders. Further, the




market participants and regulators. First, CSRC has imposed several regulations to
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encourage the cash distribution, but their actual influence on the listed firms’ payout
patterns isquestionable.Forexample, tobond the issuanceofnewsecuritieswithcash
dividend distribution effectively increases the financial cost of listed firms. Instead,
investorswilldeterminewhethertheypreferfuturegrowthorcurrentcashreturnbyusing
their voting rights in the annual general meeting. As the market evolves, excessive
regulations slowdownoreven impede thenormaldevelopmentof listed firmsand the
capitalmarket. Second, the different tax treatment on cash dividend and capital gain
underminetheattractivenessofmakingcashdistribution. Itmightbemoreconstructive
thattheregulatorcontemplateathoroughreformwithregardstothetaxationoffinancial
transactions. Finally, this study reflects some inherent weakness of a governmentͲ
sponsoredcapitalmarket,especiallytheimbalancedownershipstructureandthetendency
toprotectlargeshareholders.Itmayrequiremoreresolutionstosortouttheseweakness
and make the capital market more functional as an important part of economic
infrastructure.




the ultimate controlling shareholders, the agency cost could be further explored
becausethepersonal interestofmanagementisnotalways in linewiththatofthe
controller or the listed firm. The potential quantitative measures include the
efficiencyofassetutilizationanddiscretionaryexpenses,consideringthe impactof
the board size (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), and executive compensation
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(Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006). Thesemeasures of agency costs can be used to




financial resources from the listed firms (Friedman et al., 2003). It would be
interesting to investigatewhether thecontrollingshareholdersareable toprovide
sufficientsupporttothefirmincasesoffinancialdistress.
iii. Theinformationcontentofchangesincashdividendscouldbefurtherinvestigated,








as themarket isgrowingrapidly.Although thisthesisonly focuseson thecashdividend
payoutpolicy,ithasdemonstratedthecontinuingevolutionoftheChineseequitymarket.
Cashdividendpayoutsused tobeneglectedbyChinese investors,but the situationhas
changeddramaticallyasmarketparticipantsareexhibitingmore interest inutilizingcash
dividendpayouts to achievebetter investment returns, andenhancementof corporate
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governance.Especially, listed firmswithprivate investorsexhibitstrongerenthusiasm in
deliberatelydesigningtheircashdividendpolicytomitigatetheagencycostoffreecash
flow.Consistentwitheconomicfundamentals,competitionisthebestcatalysttoencourage
innovation and improve efficiency. In the long run, the Chinese government’s financial

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 (1)OLS pͲvalue (2)FMB pͲvalue (1)OLS pͲvalue (2)FMB pͲvalue (3)OLS pͲvalue (4)FMB pͲvalue (5)FE pͲvalue (6)RE pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.135** (0.047) 0.037 (0.885) 0.056 (0.499) 0.108 (0.341) 0.408*** (0.000) 0.472*** (0.001) 1.142*** (0.000) 0.691*** (0.000)
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.185*** (0.000) 0.183*** (0.002) 0.156*** (0.000) 0.157*** (0.000) 0.108*** (0.000) 0.107*** (0.000) 0.134** (0.015) 0.129*** (0.000)
Dummy_LowControl Ͳ0.066*** (0.002) Ͳ0.045 (0.205) Ͳ0.024** (0.034) Ͳ0.012 (0.515) 0.003 (0.842) 0.006 (0.674) 0.031 (0.130) 0.020 (0.224)
Size 0.050*** (0.000) 0.041*** (0.006) 0.012*** (0.000) 0.009 (0.106) Ͳ0.007** (0.036) Ͳ0.006 (0.107) Ͳ0.036*** (0.007) Ͳ0.018*** (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.029*** (0.000) Ͳ0.042*** (0.002) Ͳ0.003* (0.085) Ͳ0.008* (0.065) 0.016*** (0.000) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.005* (0.048) 0.009*** (0.000)
FREE_CF 0.011 (0.369) 0.016 (0.196) 0.013* (0.072) 0.016* (0.093) 0.009 (0.181) 0.007 (0.413) 0.000 (0.957) 0.003 (0.694)
ROE 2.359*** (0.000) 2.609*** (0.000) 0.234*** (0.000) 0.328** (0.018) Ͳ1.168*** (0.000) Ͳ1.281*** (0.000) Ͳ1.294*** (0.000) Ͳ1.261*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.081*** (0.000) Ͳ0.072*** (0.004) Ͳ0.023** (0.019) Ͳ0.020 (0.276) 0.025*** (0.010) 0.022 (0.212) 0.017* (0.088) 0.021** (0.020)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.126*** (0.000) Ͳ0.126*** (0.000) Ͳ0.069*** (0.000) Ͳ0.073*** (0.001) Ͳ0.036*** (0.000) Ͳ0.038*** (0.001) Ͳ0.025** (0.039) Ͳ0.036*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.090*** (0.000) 0.087*** (0.000) 0.010 (0.260) 0.010 (0.325) Ͳ0.040*** (0.000) Ͳ0.039*** (0.005) Ͳ0.050*** (0.000) Ͳ0.045*** (0.000)
YearDummy Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
IndustryDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 6,386  6,386  6,386  6,386  4,243  4,243  4,243  4,243 
R2 0.191  0.211  0.080  0.081  0.189  0.153  0.272   
Adj.R2 0.188    0.077    0.185    0.27   
FͲtest 95.5  1148.1  31.1  161.9  53.3  34.3  38.4   














 DPrivate DSOECG DSOELG DSAMB DPrivate DSOECG DSOELG DSAMB
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
CONTROL_RIGHTS 1.49 0.6711 1.53 0.6542 1.49 0.6708 1.49 0.6692 1.50 0.6651 1.50 0.6686 1.51 0.6622 1.54 0.6480 1.50 0.6651
UCS_Dummy ×
CONTROL_RIGHTS           1.16 0.8612 1.01 0.9795 1.07 0.9361 1.13 0.8849
UCS_Dummy   1.20 0.8350 1.00 0.9951 1.03 0.9741 1.13 0.8849        
Dummy_LowControl 1.40 0.7151 1.40 0.7150 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7150 1.40 0.7147 1.40 0.7137 1.40 0.7145 1.40 0.7149 0.40 0.7147
SIZE 1.41 0.7117 1.47 0.6802 1.41 0.7111 1.41 0.7085 1.48 0.6742 1.47 0.6783 1.41 0.7111 1.41 0.7075 1.48 0.6742
PRICE_TO_BOOK 1.26 0.7954 1.26 0.7918 1.26 0.7953 1.26 0.7916 1.26 0.7952 1.27 0.7895 1.26 0.7952 1.26 0.7913 1.26 0.7952
FREE_CF 1.50 0.6657 1.51 0.6623 1.50 0.6657 1.50 0.6651 1.50 0.6646 1.51 0.6622 1.50 0.6657 1.50 0.6647 1.50 0.6646
ROE 1.40 0.7142 1.41 0.7078 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7128 1.40 0.7129 1.41 0.7085 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7127 1.40 0.7129
RPTTIMING 1.05 0.9557 1.05 0.9557 1.05 0.9554 1.05 0.9551 1.05 0.9551 1.05 0.9556 1.05 0.9556 1.05 0.9544 1.05 0.9551
LEVERAGE 1.66 0.6018 1.66 0.6011 1.66 0.6012 1.66 0.6010 1.66 0.6015 1.66 0.6014 1.66 0.6010 1.66 0.6009 1.66 0.6015
SDCR 1.04 0.9640 1.07 0.9327 1.04 0.9631 1.04 0.9603 1.05 0.9533 1.08 0.9259 1.04 0.9632 1.04 0.9604 1.05 0.9533





 DPrivate DSOECG DSOELG DSAMB DPrivate DSOECG DSOELG DSAMB
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
CONTROL_RIGHTS 1.49 0.6711 1.53 0.6542 1.49 0.6708 1.49 0.6692 1.50 0.6651 1.50 0.6686 1.51 0.6622 1.54 0.6480 1.69 0.5927
UCS_Dummy×
CONTROL_RIGHTS           1.16 0.8612 1.02 0.9795 1.07 0.9361 1.34 0.7477
UCS_Dummy   1.20 0.8350 1.00 0.9951 1.03 0.9741 1.13 0.8849        
Dummy_LowControl 1.40 0.7151 1.40 0.7150 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7150 1.40 0.7147 1.40 0.7137 1.40 0.7145 1.40 0.7149 1.40 1.7150
SIZE 1.41 0.7117 1.47 0.6802 1.41 0.7111 1.41 0.7085 1.48 0.6742 1.47 0.6783 1.41 0.7111 1.41 0.7075 1.48 0.6751
PRICE_TO_BOOK 1.26 0.7954 1.26 0.7918 1.26 0.7953 1.26 0.7916 1.26 0.7952 1.27 0.7895 1.26 0.7952 1.26 0.7913 1.26 0.7949
FREE_CF 1.50 0.6657 1.51 0.6623 1.50 0.6657 1.50 0.6651 1.50 0.6646 1.51 0.6622 1.50 0.6657 1.50 0.6647 1.50 0.6649
ROE 1.40 0.7142 1.41 0.7078 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7128 1.40 0.7129 1.41 0.7085 1.40 0.7139 1.40 0.7127 1.40 0.7136
RPTTIMING 1.05 0.9557 1.05 0.9557 1.05 0.9554 1.05 0.9551 1.05 0.9551 1.05 0.9556 1.05 0.9556 1.05 0.9544 1.05 0.9550
LEVERAGE 1.66 0.6018 1.66 0.6011 1.66 0.6012 1.66 0.6010 1.66 0.6015 1.66 0.6014 1.66 0.6010 1.66 0.6009 1.66 0.6017
SDCR 1.04 0.9640 1.07 0.9327 1.04 0.9631 1.04 0.9603 1.05 0.9533 1.08 0.9259 1.04 0.9632 1.04 0.9604 1.05 0.9528






















N 5,126  
ɍ2 180.0  
rho 0.115  
sigma 0.148  
PanelB:selectionbiasbetweencashdividendpayoutandtypesofUCSs
 coefficient pͲvalue coefficient pͲvalue coefficient pͲvalue coefficient pͲvalue
Step1 DPrivate DSOECG DSOELG DSAMB
Intercept 3.135*** (0.000) Ͳ0.525*** (0.000) 0.316** (0.048) Ͳ1.925*** (0.000)
LaggedSIZE Ͳ0.132*** (0.000) 0.026*** (0.000) Ͳ0.009 (0.213) 0.115*** (0.000)
LaggedLEVERAGE 0.053*** (0.006) Ͳ0.027** (0.011) 0.003 (0.818) Ͳ0.022 (0.278)
LaggedPRICE_TO_BOOK 0.020*** (0.000) 0.002 (0.267) Ͳ0.007** (0.016) Ͳ0.016*** (0.000)
Step2 DUMMY_CASHDIV DUMMY_CASHDIV DUMMY_CASHDIV DUMMY_CASHDIV
Intercept Ͳ5.200 (0.119) Ͳ5.200 (0.119) Ͳ5.200 (0.119) Ͳ5.200 (0.119)
CONTROL_RIGHTS 0.661*** (0.000) 0.661*** (0.000) 0.661*** (0.000) 0.661*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.277 (0.000) Ͳ0.277 (0.000) Ͳ0.277 (0.000) Ͳ0.277 (0.000)
PRICE_TO_BOOK Ͳ0.088 (0.000) Ͳ0.088 (0.000) Ͳ0.088 (0.000) Ͳ0.088 (0.000)
FREE_CF Ͳ0.016 (0.703) Ͳ0.016 (0.703) Ͳ0.016 (0.703) Ͳ0.016 (0.703)
ROE 8.233*** (0.000) 8.233*** (0.000) 8.233*** (0.000) 8.233*** (0.000)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.220*** (0.000) Ͳ0.220*** (0.000) Ͳ0.220*** (0.000) Ͳ0.220*** (0.000)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.463*** (0.000) Ͳ0.463*** (0.000) Ͳ0.463*** (0.000) Ͳ0.463*** (0.000)
SDCR 0.174*** (0.003) 0.174*** (0.003) 0.174*** (0.003) 0.174*** (0.003)
Mill’slambda Ͳ0.053 (0.119) Ͳ0.072 (0.000) 0.027 (0.272) Ͳ0.559* (0.095)
N 5,162  5,162  5,162  5,162 
ɍ2 289.7  23.59  6.873  193.7 
rho Ͳ0.119  0.290  Ͳ0.084  Ͳ0.097 




which is determined by all control variables. Step 2 regress CONTROL_RIGHTS on SIZE, LEVERAGE and








 CAR_PRE  CAR_SHORT  CAR_MEDIUM  CAR_LONG 
Intercept 0.1491*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0516** Ͳ0.0026 0.0003 (0.990) 0.0895** (0.012)
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.1379 (0.075) 0.1843** Ͳ0.0038 0.2214*** (0.005) 0.2817** (0.016)
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0000 (0.897) Ͳ0.0001 Ͳ0.074 Ͳ0.0001 (0.285) Ͳ0.0004** (0.038)
SDCR 0.0216*** (0.000) 0.0225*** (0.000) 0.0328*** (0.000) 0.0405*** (0.000)
SDRE 0.0050 (0.162) 0.0096*** (0.000) 0.0097*** (0.005) 0.0094* (0.070)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0224*** (0.000) 0.0021 (0.335) Ͳ0.0009 (0.750) Ͳ0.0108** (0.010)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ1.4415*** (0.000) Ͳ0.5478*** (0.000) Ͳ1.2211*** (0.000) Ͳ2.5043*** (0.000)
Size Ͳ0.0011 (0.198) 0.0023*** (0.000) 0.0012 (0.165) 0.0000 (0.991)
LEVERAGE 0.0005 (0.730) 0.0007 (0.590) Ͳ0.0002 (0.885) 0.0021 (0.411)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.063  0.045  0.063  0.085 
FͲtest 16.14  12.65  16.31  20.88 
PanelBCashͲonlypayersbeforewinsorization
 CAR_PRE  CAR_SHORT  CAR3_MEDIUM  CAR_LONG 
Intercept 0.1488*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0757*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0255 (0.303) 0.0658* (0.086)
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0656 (0.408) 0.2017*** (0.002) 0.1997** (0.017) 0.2068* (0.094)
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0001 (0.625) Ͳ0.0001 (0.243) Ͳ0.0001 (0.480) Ͳ0.0006** (0.025)
SDCR        
SDRE        
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0207*** (0.000) 0.0014 (0.561) Ͳ0.0018 (0.546) Ͳ0.0093** (0.036)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ1.3992*** (0.000) Ͳ0.4220*** (0.006) Ͳ1.0093*** (0.000) Ͳ2.2535*** (0.000)
Size Ͳ0.0011 (0.228) 0.0034*** (0.000) 0.0024*** (0.007) 0.001 (0.489)
LEVERAGE Ͳ0.0008 (0.639) 0.0007 (0.646) Ͳ0.0014 (0.437) 0.002 (0.481)
YearDummy Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.055  0.023  0.0407  0.0806 










 Table5.6(Eq.5.7) Table5.7(Eq.5.7) Table5.9(Eq.5.9)
Variables VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
UNEXPECTGED_DPS 1.04 0.9640 1.03 0.9728 1.02 0.9782
UNEXPECTGED_EPS 1.03 0.9673 1.03 0.9723 1.02 0.9779
SDCR 1.16 0.8638    
SDRE 1.15 0.8678    
RPTTIMING 1.03 0.9750 1.03 0.9693 1.02 0.9790
IDIO_RISK 1.04 0.9645 1.03 0.9677 1.03 0.9755
Size 1.14 0.8752 1.13 0.8844 1.13 0.8814
LEVERAGE 1.14 0.8745 1.13 0.8840 1.11 0.8984
      






 CAR_PRE pͲvalue CAR_SHORT pͲvalue CAR_MEDIUM pͲvalue CAR_LONG pͲvalue
Intercept 0.1271*** (0.010) Ͳ0.0536*** (0.005) Ͳ0.0088 (0.754) 0.0937 (0.235)
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0903 (0.494) 0.2270* (0.082) 0.2506** (0.049) 0.3348** (0.041)
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0016** (0.034) 0.0007 (0.465) Ͳ0.0005 (0.514) Ͳ0.0005 (0.638)
SDCR 0.0193*** (0.003) 0.0221*** (0.000) 0.0311*** (0.000) 0.0347*** (0.000)
SDRE 0.0028 (0.497) 0.0088*** (0.004) 0.0076* (0.074) 0.0076 (0.237)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0212*** (0.002) Ͳ0.0001 (0.956) Ͳ0.0026 (0.445) Ͳ0.0104 (0.209)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ1.2862*** (0.000) Ͳ0.4955*** (0.001) Ͳ0.9996*** (0.000) Ͳ2.3320*** (0.002)
Size Ͳ0.0001 (0.939) 0.0026*** (0.001) 0.0016 (0.211) Ͳ0.0003 (0.940)
LEVERAGE 0.0025 (0.459) Ͳ0.0001 (0.928) Ͳ0.0002 (0.946) 0.0049 (0.453)
N 6,071  6,071  6,071  6,071 
R2 0.078  0.065  0.064  0.082 
PanelB:UnexpectedcashdividendandCAR
 CAR_PRE pͲvalue CAR_SHORT pͲvalue CAR_MEDIUM pͲvalue CAR_LONG pͲvalue
Intercept 0.1162** (0.013) Ͳ0.0736*** (0.003) Ͳ0.0236 (0.426) 0.079 (0.291)
UNEXPECTED_DPS 0.0647 (0.553) 0.2289* (0.085) 0.2398* (0.086) 0.3052** (0.032)
UNEXPECTED_EPS 0.0015*** (0.010) 0.0003 (0.711) Ͳ0.0011 (0.261) Ͳ0.0007 (0.593)
RPTTIMING Ͳ0.0203*** (0.000) Ͳ0.0011 (0.716) Ͳ0.0048 (0.322) Ͳ0.0119 (0.187)
IDIO_RISK Ͳ1.1697*** (0.000) Ͳ0.3676** (0.038) Ͳ0.7624*** (0.002) Ͳ1.9622*** (0.002)
Size 0.0001 (0.967) 0.0036*** (0.000) 0.0025** (0.046) 0.0003 (0.930)
LEVERAGE 0.0008 (0.821) Ͳ0.0001 (0.972) Ͳ0.0019 (0.528) 0.0047 (0.502)
N 4,806  4,806  4,806  4,806 










 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue (6) pͲvalue
Intercept 2.872*** (0.005) 2.168*** (0.027) 3.462*** (0.001) Ͳ0.742*** (0.007) 0.023 (0.937) Ͳ0.931*** (0.001)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.612*** (0.000) 0.699*** (0.000) 1.062*** (0.000)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.134** (0.012) 0.168*** (0.001) 0.153*** (0.004)
SIZE Ͳ0.155*** (0.000) Ͳ0.126*** (0.003) Ͳ0.175*** (0.000) 0.005 (0.681) Ͳ0.028** (0.023) 0.016 (0.194)
EXPECTED_ROA   16.430*** (0.000)     12.324*** (0.000)  
DIVYIELD     Ͳ21.943*** (0.000)     Ͳ5.175*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.014 (0.480) Ͳ0.074*** (0.000) Ͳ0.048** (0.020) 0.008 (0.462) Ͳ0.059*** (0.000) 0.004 (0.687)
CURRENT_EPSG Ͳ0.007 (0.616) Ͳ0.022 (0.143) 0.008 (0.553) 0.015 (0.284) 0.004 (0.793) 0.016 (0.267)
FUTURE_AG 0.403*** (0.000) 0.362*** (0.000) 0.411*** (0.000) 0.532*** (0.000) 0.499*** (0.000) 0.533*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.099  0.123  0.137  0.092  0.118  0.096 
FͲtest 20.269  22.749  22.813  27.948  31.95  27.48 
PanelB:cashpayersample
 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue (5) pͲvalue (6) pͲvalue
Intercept 3.170*** (0.000) 2.594*** (0.001) 3.570*** (0.000) Ͳ0.746*** (0.001) Ͳ0.074 (0.738) Ͳ0.895*** (0.000)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.544*** (0.000) 0.602*** (0.000) 0.999*** (0.000)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.109*** (0.000) 0.136*** (0.000) 0.126*** (0.000)
SDRE Ͳ0.250*** (0.000) Ͳ0.258*** (0.000) Ͳ0.258*** (0.000) Ͳ0.268*** (0.000) Ͳ0.268*** (0.000) Ͳ0.272*** (0.000)
SDCR Ͳ0.140*** (0.000) Ͳ0.163*** (0.000) Ͳ0.164*** (0.000) Ͳ0.172*** (0.000) Ͳ0.197*** (0.000) Ͳ0.196*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.167*** (0.000) Ͳ0.143*** (0.000) Ͳ0.179*** (0.000) 0.007 (0.424) Ͳ0.021** (0.025) 0.016* (0.087)
EXPECTED_ROA   13.492*** (0.000)     10.783*** (0.000)  
DIVYIELD     Ͳ20.472*** (0.000)     Ͳ4.471*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.021* (0.082) Ͳ0.067*** (0.000) Ͳ0.043*** (0.000) 0.006 (0.419) Ͳ0.051*** (0.000) 0.003 (0.621)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.001 (0.905) Ͳ0.011 (0.300) 0.015 (0.126) 0.007 (0.472) Ͳ0.002 (0.839) 0.007 (0.447)
FUTURE_AG 0.399*** (0.000) 0.363*** (0.000) 0.399*** (0.000) 0.492*** (0.000) 0.465*** (0.000) 0.490*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.R2 0.143  0.165  0.18  0.123  0.15  0.126 










 (1)OLS pͲvalue (2)FM pͲvalue (3)RE pͲvalue (4)OLS pͲvalue (5)FM pͲvalue (6)RE pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.837*** (0.004) Ͳ0.264 (0.487) Ͳ0.809*** (0.008) Ͳ0.832*** (0.000) Ͳ0.169 (0.411) Ͳ0.834*** (0.000)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.785*** (0.000) 0.851*** (0.001) 0.880*** (0.000) 0.658*** (0.000) 0.733*** (0.000) 0.688*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.009 (0.477) 0.013 (0.510) 0.008 (0.551) 0.005 (0.577) 0.01 (0.340) 0.005 (0.532)
EXPECTED_ROA 18.361*** (0.000) 21.162*** (0.000) 19.659*** (0.000) 13.699*** (0.000) 16.493*** (0.000) 14.130*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ19.209*** (0.000) Ͳ23.247*** (0.000) Ͳ21.035*** (0.000) Ͳ16.050*** (0.000) Ͳ20.122*** (0.000) Ͳ16.585*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.118*** (0.000) Ͳ0.177*** (0.002) Ͳ0.123*** (0.000) Ͳ0.102*** (0.000) Ͳ0.151*** (0.000) Ͳ0.104*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.012 (0.375) 0.033 (0.129) 0.008 (0.566)      
CURRENT_EBITG       Ͳ0.011 (0.302) Ͳ0.009 (0.539) Ͳ0.013 (0.254)
FUTURE_AG 0.543*** (0.000) 0.537*** (0.000) 0.523*** (0.000) 0.744*** (0.000) 0.720*** (0.000) 0.734*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
R2 0.159  0.15    0.22  0.19   
Adj.R2 0.156      0.217     
FͲtest 36.68  38.05    48.6  54.48   
PanelBCashpayersample FUTURE_EPSG FUTURE_EBITG
 OLS pͲvalue FM pͲvalue RE pͲvalue OLS pͲvalue FM pͲvalue RE pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.870*** (0.000) Ͳ0.417 (0.162) Ͳ0.829*** (0.000) Ͳ1.101*** (0.000) Ͳ0.385** (0.047) Ͳ1.101*** (0.000)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.699*** (0.000) 0.786*** (0.000) 0.760*** (0.000) 0.659*** (0.000) 0.755*** (0.000) 0.659*** (0.000)
SDRE Ͳ0.179*** (0.000) Ͳ0.166*** (0.000) Ͳ0.181*** (0.000) Ͳ0.052** (0.047) Ͳ0.047 (0.107) Ͳ0.052** (0.045)
SDCR Ͳ0.255*** (0.000) Ͳ0.256*** (0.000) Ͳ0.259*** (0.000) 0.072*** (0.000) 0.070** (0.022) 0.072*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.012 (0.218) 0.019 (0.211) 0.010 (0.310) 0.014* (0.067) 0.018** (0.032) 0.014* (0.051)
EXPECTED_ROA 15.241*** (0.000) 17.648*** (0.000) 15.885*** (0.000) 12.734*** (0.000) 15.052*** (0.000) 12.734*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ16.811*** (0.000) Ͳ20.736*** (0.000) Ͳ17.907*** (0.000) Ͳ15.735*** (0.000) Ͳ19.819*** (0.000) Ͳ15.735*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.091*** (0.000) Ͳ0.149*** (0.001) Ͳ0.094*** (0.000) Ͳ0.083*** (0.000) Ͳ0.140*** (0.000) Ͳ0.083*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.004 (0.628) 0.026 (0.137) 0.003 (0.722)      
CURRENT_EBITG       Ͳ0.009 (0.318) 0.000 (0.973) Ͳ0.009 (0.310)
FUTURE_AG 0.496*** (0.000) 0.489*** (0.000) 0.488*** (0.000) 0.760*** (0.000) 0.735*** (0.000) 0.760*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
R2 0.188  0.173    0.233  0.198   
Adj.R2 0.185      0.23     













Intercept 0.057 (0.406) Ͳ0.002 (0.976) 0.024 (0.662) 0.002 (0.961)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.886*** (0.005) 1.304*** (0.000) 0.809*** (0.001) 1.083*** (0.000)
SDRE   Ͳ0.140*** (0.004) 0.038 (0.356)
SDCR   Ͳ0.245*** (0.000) 0.098*** (0.000)
EXPECTED_ROA 21.267*** (0.000) 18.760*** (0.000) 17.737*** (0.000) 16.471*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ17.965*** (0.000) Ͳ20.652*** (0.000) Ͳ15.685*** (0.000) Ͳ17.677*** (0.000)
FUTURE_AG 0.167*** (0.000) 0.300*** (0.000) 0.147*** (0.000) 0.271*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.164*** (0.000) Ͳ0.172 (0.000) Ͳ0.128*** (0.000) Ͳ0.134*** (0.000)
R2 0.070  0.052 0.100  0.080
FͲtest 49.74  64.95 71.45  63.88
#Observations 4,277  4,277 5,380  5,380
 PanelD:FirstStageforCASH_PAYOUT
Intercept 0.914*** (0.000) 0.904*** (0.000) 0.935*** (0.000) 0.935*** (0.000)
SDRE   Ͳ0.123*** (0.000) Ͳ0.121*** (0.000)
SDCR   Ͳ0.042*** (0.000) Ͳ0.040*** (0.000)
EXPECTED_ROA Ͳ4.404*** (0.000) Ͳ4.351*** (0.000) Ͳ3.738*** (0.000) Ͳ3.693*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD 11.344*** (0.000) 11.354*** (0.000) 11.423*** (0.000) 11.427*** (0.000)
FUTURE_AG Ͳ0.055*** (0.000) Ͳ0.055*** (0.000) Ͳ0.044*** (0.000) Ͳ0.044*** (0.000)
TOBING’S_Q 0.054*** (0.000) 0.054*** (0.000) 0.042*** (0.000) 0.043*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.033*** (0.000) Ͳ0.032*** (0.000) Ͳ0.033*** (0.000) Ͳ0.033*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG Ͳ0.012*** (0.000) Ͳ0.010*** (0.000) 
CURRENT_EBITG   Ͳ0.019*** (0.000)  Ͳ0.017*** (0.000)




96.18  106.13  128.93  140.66 
Sarganoverid
pͲvalue
0.37  0.53  0.93  0.24 
Thistablereports theestimation resultsofequation (6.1)and (6.2) forFUTURE_EPSGandFUTURE_EBITG
usingOLS,FamaͲMacbeth(1973)twoͲstepprocedureandarandomeffectmodel.PanelAandPanelBcontain










 (1)High pͲvalue (2)Medium pͲvalue (3)Low pͲvalue (4)High pͲvalue (5)Medium pͲvalue (6)Low pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.674 (0.257) 0.194 (0.532) Ͳ0.487 (0.642) Ͳ0.190 (0.778) 0.062 (0.919) 0.712 (0.361)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.594** (0.026) 0.864** (0.042) 1.807*** (0.001)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.509** (0.013) 0.321 (0.336) Ͳ0.105 (0.523)
SIZE 0.043 (0.129) Ͳ0.003 (0.867) 0.020 (0.696) 0.021 (0.478) 0.001 (0.975) Ͳ0.030 (0.425)
EXPECTED_ROA 27.948*** (0.000) 19.377*** (0.000) 20.681*** (0.000) 22.816*** (0.000) 13.745*** (0.003) 18.026*** (0.001)
DIVYIELD Ͳ24.432*** (0.000) Ͳ25.514*** (0.001) Ͳ37.968*** (0.000) Ͳ20.177*** (0.003) Ͳ7.186*** (0.006) Ͳ10.756*** (0.003)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.228*** (0.009) Ͳ0.159*** (0.004) Ͳ0.212*** (0.000) Ͳ0.191*** (0.000) Ͳ0.094** (0.046) Ͳ0.120** (0.013)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.007 (0.914) 0.047 (0.113) Ͳ0.008 (0.686) Ͳ0.001 (0.982) 0.037 (0.718) Ͳ0.013 (0.649)
FUTURE_AG 0.523*** (0.000) 0.464*** (0.002) 0.641*** (0.002) 0.613** (0.004) 0.476*** (0.000) 0.509*** (0.002)
N 1,283  1,711  1,283  1,283  1,711  1,283 
R2 0.186  0.178  0.19  0.163  0.14  0.156 
FͲtest 18.34  97.526  231.025  36.282  46.669  7.267 
PanelB:FUTURE_EBITG– cashͲonlyͲpayersample
 (1)High pͲvalue (2)Medium pͲvalue (3)Low pͲvalue (4)High pͲvalue (5)Medium pͲvalue (6)Low pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.202 (0.648) Ͳ0.166 (0.422) Ͳ0.304 (0.693) Ͳ0.102 (0.860) 0.189 (0.651) 0.780 (0.106)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.534** (0.011) 0.806** (0.026) 1.737*** (0.000)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.332*** (0.006) 0.488 (0.121) Ͳ0.164 (0.309)
SIZE 0.023 (0.267) 0.011 (0.341) 0.012 (0.750) 0.020 (0.750) Ͳ0.004 (0.750) Ͳ0.034 (0.750)
EXPECTED_ROA 22.435*** (0.000) 15.056*** (0.000) 14.793*** (0.000) 17.630*** (0.000) 11.145*** (0.002) 12.540*** (0.003)
DIVYIELD Ͳ21.485*** (0.000) Ͳ21.773*** (0.000) Ͳ35.332*** (0.000) Ͳ17.983*** (0.000) Ͳ6.200*** (0.001) Ͳ7.529*** (0.009)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.218*** (0.003) Ͳ0.133*** (0.000) Ͳ0.154*** (0.001) Ͳ0.163*** (0.000) Ͳ0.095*** (0.006) Ͳ0.083*** (0.001)
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ0.012 (0.440) 0.03 (0.280) Ͳ0.013 (0.486) Ͳ0.055** (0.045) Ͳ0.066 (0.147) Ͳ0.023 (0.384)
FUTURE_AG 0.655*** (0.000) 0.771*** (0.000) 0.689*** (0.000) 0.750*** (0.000) 0.703*** (0.000) 0.669*** (0.000)
N 1,283  1,711  1,283  1,283  1,711  1,283 
R2 0.211  0.251  0.225  0.194  0.206  0.203 





 (13)High pͲvalue (14)Medium pͲvalue (15)Low pͲvalue (16)High pͲvalue (17)Medium pͲvalue (18)Low pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.745 (0.138) Ͳ0.168 (0.684) Ͳ0.615 (0.220) Ͳ0.266 (0.599) Ͳ0.057 (0.907) 0.333 (0.547)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.541** (0.011) 1.174*** (0.001) 2.176*** (0.000)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.441*** (0.007) 0.037 (0.871) Ͳ0.150 (0.170)
SDRE Ͳ0.142 (0.110) Ͳ0.128** (0.016) Ͳ0.112*** (0.000) Ͳ0.328*** (0.004) Ͳ0.171*** (0.006) Ͳ0.217*** (0.001)
SDCR Ͳ0.263*** (0.001) Ͳ0.243*** (0.000) Ͳ0.237*** (0.000) Ͳ0.307*** (0.000) Ͳ0.286*** (0.000) Ͳ0.254*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.044* (0.071) 0.007 (0.746) 0.022 (0.380) 0.023 (0.298) 0.005 (0.833) Ͳ0.013 (0.619)
EXPECTED_ROA 24.201*** (0.000) 17.624*** (0.000) 14.581*** (0.000) 19.139*** (0.000) 12.361*** (0.001) 15.276*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ21.835*** (0.000) Ͳ26.964*** (0.000) Ͳ32.653*** (0.002) Ͳ18.572*** (0.001) Ͳ5.409** (0.022) Ͳ8.521*** (0.002)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.189*** (0.004) Ͳ0.154*** (0.000) Ͳ0.159*** (0.004) Ͳ0.144*** (0.000) Ͳ0.088** (0.028) Ͳ0.116*** (0.002)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.017 (0.629) 0.047 (0.055) 0.026 (0.393) 0.003 (0.888) Ͳ0.020 (0.482) Ͳ0.002 (0.897)
FUTURE_AG 0.462*** (0.000) 0.491*** (0.000) 0.480*** (0.000) 0.468*** (0.003) 0.428*** (0.000) 0.500*** (0.002)
N 1,614  2,152  1,614  1,614  2,152  1,614 
R2 0.201  0.19  0.214  0.162  0.178  0.181 
FͲtest 79.422  55.672  8.30E+04  650.027  28.312  357.178 
PanelD:FUTURE_EBITG– cashͲpayersample
 (19)High pͲvalue (20)Medium pͲvalue (21)Low pͲvalue (22)High pͲvalue (23)Medium pͲvalue (24)Low pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.410 (0.277) Ͳ0.365 (0.143) Ͳ0.558 (0.140) Ͳ0.314 (0.538) Ͳ0.045 (0.906) 0.425 (0.309)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.544*** (0.004) 0.999*** (0.000) 2.414*** (0.000)      
ȴCASH_PAYOUT       0.357*** (0.001) 0.35 (0.131) Ͳ0.209* (0.060)
SDRE Ͳ0.044 (0.274) Ͳ0.008 (0.871) Ͳ0.008 (0.819) Ͳ0.243** (0.014) Ͳ0.055 (0.106) Ͳ0.088* (0.072)
SDCR 0.095* (0.064) 0.074** (0.035) 0.076 (0.109) 0.069 (0.132) 0.042 (0.158) 0.040 (0.142)
SIZE 0.030 (0.112) 0.015 (0.185) 0.02 (0.187) 0.028 (0.240) 0.004 (0.772) Ͳ0.020 (0.310)
EXPECTED_ROA 20.331*** (0.000) 13.420*** (0.000) 14.416*** (0.000) 15.716*** (0.000) 10.479*** (0.001) 11.823*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ20.268*** (0.000) Ͳ22.918*** (0.000) Ͳ39.125*** (0.000) Ͳ17.617*** (0.000) Ͳ5.786*** (0.006) Ͳ6.590*** (0.002)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.198*** (0.001) Ͳ0.128*** (0.000) Ͳ0.158*** (0.001) Ͳ0.135*** (0.000) Ͳ0.084*** (0.008) Ͳ0.094*** (0.001)
CURRENT_EBITG Ͳ0.006 (0.583) 0.039* (0.095) 0.001 (0.953) Ͳ0.045** (0.025) Ͳ0.046 (0.100) Ͳ0.004 (0.840)
FUTURE_AG 0.713*** (0.000) 0.801*** (0.000) 0.665*** (0.000) 0.699*** (0.000) 0.672*** (0.000) 0.764*** (0.000)
N 1614  2152  1614  1,614  2,152  1,614 
R2 0.221  0.242  0.256  0.182  0.224  0.219 












 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue (4) pͲvalue
Intercept Ͳ0.757* (0.066) Ͳ0.777** (0.052) Ͳ0.981* (0.078) Ͳ1.067** (0.047)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.642*** (0.008) 0.667*** (0.005) 0.905*** (0.001) 0.948*** (0.001)
SDRE Ͳ0.060 (0.160)   Ͳ0.001 (0.971)  
SDCR Ͳ0.119** (0.040) Ͳ0.113** (0.043) 0.104 (0.104) 0.129* (0.053)
STOCK_PAYOUT   Ͳ0.123 (0.114)   0.081 (0.416)
SIZE 0.026 (0.123) 0.027 (0.107) 0.039* (0.098) 0.041* (0.068)
EXPECTED_ROA 11.227*** (0.000) 11.175*** (0.000) 12.800*** (0.000) 13.056*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ16.099*** (0.003) Ͳ16.643*** (0.003) Ͳ20.290*** (0.003) Ͳ20.597*** (0.002)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.094 (0.104) Ͳ0.094 (0.101) Ͳ0.124* (0.063) Ͳ0.126* (0.056)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.012 (0.403) 0.011 (0.456)    
CURRENT_EBITG     0.047 (0.168) 0.044 (0.206)
FUTURE_AG 0.370*** (0.003) 0.363*** (0.004) 0.779*** (0.000) 0.759*** (0.000)
N 1103  1103  1103  1103 
R2 0.248  0.247  0.319  0.322 
FͲtest 85.641  89.39  26.178  183.89 
This table reports the estimation results of equation (6.2) for FUTURE_EPSG and FUTURE_EBITG of cash
dividendpayerswith simultaneous stockdividend.Eq.6.2 isestimatedusing theFamaͲMacbeth twoͲstep








FUTURE_EPSG2 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue
Intercept 3.590*** (0.000) Ͳ0.403 (0.112) 0.118 (0.460)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.771*** (0.000) 0.634***   
ȴCASH_PAYOUT     0.148*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.160*** (0.000) 0.021* (0.096) Ͳ0.002 (0.816)
EXPECTED_ROA Ͳ2.216* (0.053) 3.195*** (0.006) Ͳ0.144 (0.851)
DIVYIELD Ͳ14.796*** (0.000) Ͳ13.247*** (0.000) Ͳ4.507*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.094*** (0.000) Ͳ0.092*** (0.002) Ͳ0.031*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG2 0.176*** (0.000) 0.273*** (0.000) 0.238*** (0.000)
FUTURE_AG2 0.107*** (0.000) 0.122*** (0.000) 0.115*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  No  Yes 
R2 0.244  0.253  0.175 
Adj.R2 0.241    0.172 
FͲtest 38.21  150.08  31.77 
PanelB:cashpayersample
FUTURE_EPSG2 (1) pͲvalue (2) pͲvalue (3) pͲvalue
Intercept 3.515*** (0.000) Ͳ0.491* (0.052) Ͳ0.003 (0.982)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.724*** (0.000) 0.592*** (0.000)  
ȴCASH_PAYOUT     0.126*** (0.000)
SDRE Ͳ0.082*** (0.001) Ͳ0.072*** (0.003) Ͳ0.142*** (0.000)
SDCR Ͳ0.119*** (0.000) Ͳ0.127*** (0.000) Ͳ0.148*** (0.000)
SIZE Ͳ0.158*** (0.000) 0.024* (0.051) Ͳ0.001 (0.902)
EXPECTED_ROA Ͳ3.493*** (0.000) 2.692*** (0.007) Ͳ0.107 (0.857)
DIVYIELD Ͳ13.615*** (0.000) Ͳ12.258*** (0.000) Ͳ4.010*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.071*** (0.000) Ͳ0.076*** (0.002) Ͳ0.025*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG2 0.184*** (0.000) 0.266*** (0.000) 0.233*** (0.000)
FUTURE_AG2 0.105*** (0.000) 0.122*** (0.000) 0.112*** (0.000)
YearDummies Yes  No  Yes 
R2 0.286  0.272  0.208 
Adj.R2 0.283    0.205 











 Coefficient pͲvalue coefficient pͲvalue Coefficient pͲvalue coefficient pͲvalue
Step2: FUTURE_EPSG FUTURE_EBITG FUTURE_EPSG FUTURE_EBITG
Intercept 4.121* (0.097) 3.750 (0.202) 2.860 (0.140) 1.287 (0.552)
CASH_PAYOUT 0.536*** (0.000) 0.742*** (0.000) 0.507*** (0.000) 0.717*** (0.000)
SDRE     Ͳ0.191** (0.013) Ͳ0.015 (0.829)
SDCR     Ͳ0.262*** (0.000) 0.072 (0.130)
SIZE Ͳ0.157 (0.101) Ͳ0.143 (0.206) Ͳ0.108 (0.146) Ͳ0.048 (0.559)
EXPECTED_ROA 20.901*** (0.000) 14.370*** (0.000) 17.126*** (0.000) 12.893*** (0.000)
DIVYIELD Ͳ12.576*** (0.000) Ͳ13.211*** (0.000) Ͳ10.990*** (0.000) Ͳ12.165*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q Ͳ0.150*** (0.000) Ͳ0.148*** (0.000) Ͳ0.129*** (0.000) Ͳ0.111*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG Ͳ0.008 (0.408)   Ͳ0.006 (0.305)  
CURRENT_EBITG   0.003 (0.250)   0.001 (0.452)
FUTURE_AG 0.130*** (0.001) 0.300*** (0.000) 0.128*** (0.000) 0.293*** (0.000)
Step1: CASH_PAYOUT CASH_PAYOUT CASH_PAYOUT CASH_PAYOUT
Intercept Ͳ6.501*** (0.000) Ͳ6.645*** (0.000) Ͳ6.466*** (0.000) Ͳ6.621*** (0.000)
SIZE 0.308*** (0.000) 0.314*** (0.000) 0.307*** (0.000) 0.313*** (0.000)
TOBIN’S_Q 0.060*** (0.000) 0.071*** (0.000) 0.093*** (0.000) 0.101*** (0.000)
CURRENT_EPSG 0.050*** (0.000)   0.046*** (0.000)  
CURRENT_EBITG   0.006** (0.019)   0.005** (0.019)
Mill’slambda Ͳ0.998 (0.105) Ͳ0.283 (0.603) Ͳ0.732 (0.138) Ͳ0.273 (0.615)
No.of
Observations 7,067  7,067  8,475  8,475 
ɍ2 116.8  162.1  179.3  211.4 
rho Ͳ0.583  Ͳ0.563  Ͳ0.488  Ͳ0.218 
sigma 1.712  1.466  1.500  1.253 
ThistablereportstheresultsofHeckmanselectionmodelonthecausalityrelationbetweenearningsgrowth
andcashdividendpayout.Thesamplesizeincludesallobservationswithpositiveorzerocashdividendpayout.
Step 1 selects observations with positive CASH_PAYOUT, which is determined by SIZE, TOBIN’S_Q and
CURRENT_EPSG (CURRENT_EBITG). Step 2 regress FUTURE_EPSG (FUTURE_EBITG) on CASH_PAYOUT and
othercontrolvariables.RefertoTable6.2forothervariabledefinitions.pͲvaluesarereportedinparentheses.
*,**and***denotesignificanceat10%,5%and1%levels,respectively.

Appendix6.7Robustnesscheck:Multicollinearity
Variables VIF 1/VIF
CASH_PAYOUT 2.01 0.4974
ȴCASH_PAYOUT 1.01 0.9937
SIZE 1.18 0.8504
EXPECTED_ROA 1.35 0.7415
DIVYIELD 2.30 0.4343
TOBIN’S_Q 1.47 0.6807
CURRENT_EPSG 1.02 0.9835
CURRENT_EBITG 1.01 0.9898
FUTURE_AG 1.06 0.9412
  
MeanVIF 1.38 
Thistablereportsthevarianceinflationfactor(VIF)andtolerance(1/VIF)ofallregressionresults
documentedinChapter5.RefertoTable5.2forvariabledefinitions.

